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ARTICLE 
TEMPORAL IMPERIALISM 
ALISON L. LACROIX† 
Issues of time and temporality pervade American constitutional adjudica-
tion, at both a doctrinal and a broader, structural level.  The doctrinal issue 
concerns the extent to which judicial decisions operate forward, backward, or 
some combination of both across time.  The structural issue concerns the related 
and overarching question of how the Supreme Court, as a court, operates in 
time, and the temporal division of authority between courts and legislatures.  In 
both contexts, the Supreme Court is an actor in time.  
This Article examines the Court’s treatment of temporal issues through 
three case studies:  (1) a pair of early decisions in which the Court confronted 
both the transition from the colonial to the republican constitutional regime, 
and the temporal scope of legislative acts; (2) the Court’s twentieth-century doc-
trine on adjudicative retroactivity; and (3) the recent case of Grutter v. Bol-
linger, in which the Court’s temporal imperialism led it to claim ever-greater 
power to define the relevant timeframe for antidiscrimination law.  The Court’s 
institutional self-presentation suggests that it is immortal and therefore not 
temporally bound, and that claim of continuity typically extends to its deci-
sions.  But the causal flow from institutional to doctrinal continuity sometimes 
breaks down.  Perhaps not surprisingly, these moments of disjunction tend to 
arise when the Court chooses to allow them to.  Even in situations that call into 
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question the continuity of a particular doctrine, therefore, the Court remains 
master of time in that it as an institution determines when and how the façade 
of doctrinal continuity is to be breached. 
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We shed as we pick up, like travellers who must carry everything in their 
arms, and what we let fall will be picked up by those behind.  The pro-
cession is very long and life is very short.  We die on the march.  But 
there is nothing outside the march so nothing can be lost to it.
1
 
INTRODUCTION 
Unlike many modern constitutional democracies, the United 
States is still in its first republic.  This means that the entity called “the 
United States of America,” as created by the Constitution, can be said 
to exist in a continuous relationship from 1789 to the present day. 
Yet even to speak of the “first republic” seems odd:  why use an 
ordinal number to denote the first and, so far, the only?  But thinking 
of the American constitutional regime in this sense—as just one in a 
potential series of regimes—is useful because it calls into question one 
of the central assumptions of American constitutional law:  the idea 
that the Republic of 2010 is in a fundamental sense continuous with 
that of 1789.  This assumption is particularly evident in the Supreme 
Court’s case law, in which the Court regularly refers to the decisions 
of past decades or even centuries as “our” decisions, or in the custom 
of tracing particular seats on the Court back to their first occupants in 
the late-eighteenth or early-nineteenth century.  The Court’s self-
presentation and self-conception thus presume continuity.2 
1 TOM STOPPARD, ARCADIA act 1, sc. 3, at 38 (1993). 
2 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995) (“In Jones & Laughlin 
Steel [1937], we held that the question of congressional power under the Commerce 
Clause ‘is necessarily one of degree.’” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)); id. at 574 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The history of our Commerce Clause decisions contains at least 
two lessons of relevance to this case.” (emphasis added)). 
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The Justices’ rhetorical insistence that the Court is both a conti-
nuous and a unitary institution is striking, however, given the obvious 
changes in membership and doctrine that the Court as an institution 
has witnessed since its founding, as well as the relative rarity of per cu-
riam decisions since the days of Chief Justice John Marshall.  As an 
analytic matter, one might reasonably argue that no such entity as “the 
Court” exists; rather, the Supreme Court is a series of courts con-
nected across a series of cases that exist along a series of moments in 
time.  For the most part, however, the Justices’ decisions suppress this 
multiplicity and discontinuity in favor of a posture of unitariness and 
continuity.  The composition of the Court thus changes over time, but 
the language of the decisions that issue from the Court presumes fix-
edness and permanence, presenting the Court as a single continuous 
entity with a single lifespan. 
Questions of time and temporality pervade American constitu-
tional theory, at both a doctrinal and a broader, structural level.3  The 
doctrinal issue concerns the extent to which law—in the forms of both 
judicial precedent and legislative action—operates forward, backward, 
or some combination of both across time.  Implicating fundamental 
questions of justice, fairness, and notice, these inquiries typically in-
volve situations in which the Supreme Court sets temporal boundaries 
on its own decisions or on the actions of another branch of govern-
ment—usually a legislature—with important consequences for indi-
vidual litigants.  The structural issue concerns the related and over-
arching question of how the Court, as a court, operates in time, and 
how the Justices articulate the temporal division of authority between 
courts and legislatures. 
3 See generally 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:  FOUNDATIONS 16-32 (1991) 
(discussing “constitutional moments” that transformed the constitutional basis of the 
Republic); JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME:  A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-
GOVERNMENT (2001) (discussing the problem of constitutionalism over time); WIL-
LIAM E. SCHEUERMAN, LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND THE SOCIAL ACCELERATION OF TIME 
(2004) (critiquing the consequences of modern notions of time for liberal democra-
cy); Lior Barshack, Time and the Constitution, 7 INT’L J. CONST. L. 553, 553 (2009) (de-
scribing two types of sovereignty:  “immanent” sovereignty that “belongs to the living” 
and “transcendent” sovereignty that “belongs . . . to the dead and to those yet to be 
born”); Mary L. Dudziak, Law, War, and the History of Time, 98 CAL. L. REV. (forthcom-
ing Oct. 2010) (manuscript at 1-4), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1374454 
(discussing the meaning and significance of “wartime”); Carol J. Greenhouse, Just in 
Time:  Temporality and the Cultural Legitimation of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1631, 1641-44 (1989) 
(analyzing how indeterminacies in Western notions of time are worked out in the law); 
Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and Constitutional Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. 
REV. 606, 610-11 (2008) (examining the connections between theories of constitution-
al authority “across generations” and methods of constitutional interpretation). 
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In both contexts, the Court is one among many actors, existing—
as all actors must—in time.  Yet the Court typically disavows this iden-
tity, presenting itself as an institution operating in a much larger tem-
poral sphere than that of any particular human observer, in a realm 
continuous with the Constitution itself.  For the most part, such a view 
comports with a general sense that the Court must operate in this way, 
that in fact it is precisely the function of courts as courts to stand for 
continuity.  One need only think of the judicial norms of stare decisis 
and precedential reasoning to appreciate the special relationship that 
courts have with time. 
Occasionally, however, the Court explicitly confronts the question 
of time—specifically, the question of change over time.  These mo-
ments of confrontation occur when the Court self-consciously ad-
dresses the issue of the temporal effect, or lifespan, of a particular leg-
islative act or judicial decision.  And here is the puzzle this Article 
takes up.  The Court’s institutional self-presentation suggests that it is 
immortal and therefore not temporally bound, and that claim of con-
tinuity typically extends to the product of that institution—namely, its 
decisions.  But not always.  The causal flow from institutional to doc-
trinal continuity sometimes breaks down.  Perhaps not surprisingly, 
these moments of disjunction tend to arise when the Court chooses to 
allow them to.  Even in situations that call into question the continuity 
of a particular doctrine, therefore, the Court remains master of time 
in that it as an institution determines when and how the façade of 
doctrinal continuity is to be breached.  In these moments, two stories 
about the Court and time emerge:  first, the lifespan of any judicial or 
legislative act is potentially finite but unknown until the moment of its 
demise; second, the demise will be brought about by an entity that 
very likely predated, and certainly will endure after, the act in question. 
To be sure, the issue of legal change is fundamental to all legal 
systems, especially systems founded on a written constitution.  But the 
Court’s unique role as a court bound by no other court, and bound 
very little (or perhaps not at all) by the decisions of any legislature, 
means that the Justices have a far greater power to define lifespans 
than do other courts.  Further, it means that the scope of the Justices’ 
power to terminate a law extends far beyond that of even the most po-
sitivist of legislatures.  The fact that the Court is not bound to obey 
any institution, even itself, means that the question whether the par-
ticular judicial decision or legislative act under consideration has out-
run its course is in some sense always potentially, and in some cases 
actually, before the Court. 
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Thus, there are important questions to ask:  How does a court that 
regards itself and the regime in which it operates as timeless conceive 
itself to be functioning in these moments of change?  What are the 
different approaches the Court uses to conceptualize the temporal 
scope of legal change—not with respect to substance, but with respect 
to time itself?  To what extent does the Court view itself as controlling 
this temporal scope?  One approach might be to view the transition 
from a prior legal state or rule in relative terms:  as a two-part legal re-
gime involving the law “before” and the law “after.”4  A different ap-
proach views the transition as unfolding over a more linear, chrono-
logical sweep of time, in what might be viewed as a more objective 
vision of how time operates.5 
Over the course of the 221 years since our Republic began, the 
Court has demonstrated varied and sometimes confused views of how 
to understand and manage temporal transitions in the legal regime.  
In some cases, the Court has segmented doctrinal time into “before” 
and “after,” devoting substantial energy to descrying the proper line 
between these periods.  In other instances, the Court has presented its 
decisions as operating within a more chronological timeframe, packag-
ing its decisions into temporal epochs and attempting to give an ac-
count of how those epochs fit together.6 
Throughout the Court’s history, explicit considerations of law’s 
temporal effect have often accompanied the Justices’ efforts to calcu-
late the moment of a particular law’s origin.  These moments of 
change involve much more than the straightforward overruling of 
prior precedent.  Rather, they are moments of transition not only with 
respect to substance but with respect to time itself.  The question this 
Article takes up is not just the Court’s own question in such situations 
of how to treat changes in the law, but the broader interpretive ques-
tion of whether the Court adjusts—or ought to adjust—its own con-
4 This is a perspectival approach that takes a subjective view of time akin to that 
described by the philosopher Hannah Arendt as “human time.”  See HANNAH ARENDT, 
BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE 11 (Viking Press 1968) (1961) (associating human time 
with “the viewpoint of man, who always lives in the interval between past and future”). 
5 Such a view has been described by Arendt as “historical time.”  Id. at 9-13 (de-
scribing historical time as a “continuum,” as “biographical,” and as “rectilinear tem-
poral movement”).  The historian Reinhart Koselleck also employs the phrase “histori-
cal time,” albeit in a slightly different sense, referring not only to the linear march of 
chronology in general but also to the belief that the chronology itself comprises a se-
ries of historically recognized “units of action” such as eras or epochs.  See REINHART 
KOSELLECK, THE PRACTICE OF CONCEPTUAL HISTORY ch. 6 (Todd Samuel Presner et al. 
trans., 2002). 
6 I am grateful to Adam Samaha for suggesting the term “packaging.” 
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ception of how its decisions operate in time.  Moments of doctrinal 
discontinuity, in other words, provide useful opportunities to interro-
gate claims of institutional continuity. 
Temporal questions are therefore deeply connected in the Court’s 
case law with questions of laws’ origins.  When the Court attempts to 
identify the moment of a particular legislative or judicial act’s origin, 
it is in effect searching for a proper measuring moment or benchmark 
upon which to base its assessment of the law’s lifespan.  This Article 
examines the Court’s efforts to calculate such moments of origin 
through three case studies:  (1) a pair of cases from the early Republic 
in which the Court grappled with the question of the temporal effect 
of legislative acts; (2) the late twentieth-century debates about retroac-
tivity in criminal law, in which the Court attempted to reorganize how 
its own decisions operate in time; and (3) the recent case of Grutter v. 
Bollinger, in which the Court experimented with drawing temporal 
boundaries around an entire body of doctrine.7 
The Court frequently speaks as though it is not a temporally 
bounded institution.  In some areas of case law, however, it explicitly 
manipulates the temporal effects of its doctrine.  Obviously, the Court 
is a historical actor and therefore must always be operating “in time.”  
This Article is part of a larger project that aims to understand the 
Court’s conflicted and problematic treatment of itself in time.  The goal 
of this Article, then, is to engage in an intellectual history of how the 
Court thinks about time—both in the sense of the temporal effect of its 
own decisions and in the context of legal transitions more broadly.8 
I.  TEMPORALITY IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 
The Court confronted foundational questions of law’s temporali-
ty, and of its own institutional role in defining that temporality, within 
the first few years of its existence.  Many of these decisions required 
the Court to construe provisions of the Constitution that implicated 
7 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
8 By referring to “the Court” as a single entity in this way, I do not mean to suggest 
that the Justices are always of one mind, or that the Court as an institution holds a sin-
gle coherent view of how its decisions operate in time.  Still, given the self-identity of 
the Justices as members of one Supreme Court of the United States, and the tendency 
of those Justices to use phrases such as “We the Court” in their opinions, this Article 
will treat the Court as more of an “it” than a “they.”  Cf. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is 
a ‘They,’ Not an ‘It’:  Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 239 
(1992) (arguing that “[l]egislative intent is an internally inconsistent, self-contradictory 
expression”). 
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deep issues of time—for example, the Ex Post Facto and Contracts 
Clauses of Article I.9 
The Clauses’ textual proximity suggests their conceptual connec-
tedness, for both proceeded from the common law’s premise that re-
troactive legislation required special scrutiny because it had the po-
tential to violate norms of notice and fairness, as well as to blur the 
line between judicial and legislative functions.10  Moreover, the fact 
that these provisions appear in Article I, Section 10, among the list of 
prohibitions on the states (no treaties, no letters of marque and re-
prisal, no coining money, no emitting bills of credit, no legal tender 
except for gold and silver) demonstrates the peril that the Founders 
believed would result if states had the power to pass ex post facto laws 
or laws impairing the obligation of contracts.11  Both provisions thus 
spoke to the harms that the drafters of the Constitution feared might 
result from a legislature’s effort to make its laws operate backward as 
well as forward in time. 
In Calder v. Bull,12 decided in 1798 during the Chief Justiceship of 
Oliver Ellsworth, and again in Ogden v. Saunders,13 the 1827 decision 
that featured Chief Justice John Marshall’s only dissent in a constitu-
tional case, the Court addressed issues of time at both the doctrinal 
and institutional levels.  Both cases called upon the Court to assess the 
temporal scope of a legislature’s actions—in Calder, a resolution of the 
Connecticut legislature setting aside a probate court’s decree,14 and in 
Ogden, a New York insolvency act.15  The cases might therefore seem to 
have little to say about the Court’s conception of itself in time.  Yet in 
each case, the Court’s extensive analysis of the legislation in question 
led it to consider not only the propriety of retroactive (or “retrospec-
tive,” in contemporary parlance) lawmaking, but also the institutional 
9 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder, ex 
post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . . .”). 
10 See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *46 (criticizing ex post facto laws 
for failing to give parties notice that an action is illegal). 
11 See generally GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 
1776–1787, at 393-429, 471-518 (1969) (discussing the influence of the political and 
economic turmoil of the Confederation period—in particular, the controversy over 
wartime debts—on the drafters of the Constitution).  The Constitution prohibits Con-
gress, as well as the states, from passing bills of attainder or ex post facto laws.  U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.  Only the states, however, are prohibited from passing laws im-
pairing the obligation of contracts.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
12 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). 
13 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827). 
14 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 386. 
15 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 214. 
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role of courts, as well as the specific role of the Court in policing tem-
poral boundaries.16 
Moreover, Calder and Ogden can themselves be historicized.17  Both 
cases illustrate the conflicts in early American legal thought between 
early republicans’ simultaneous commitments to legislative power and 
to the idea that the judicial power existed in part to protect vested 
rights (sometimes from the selfsame legislative power).  The specter 
of property rights being manipulated by the government as tools of 
political oppression, familiar to eighteenth-century Anglo-Americans 
from their constitutional history of the Tudor and Stuart periods, con-
tinued to haunt some early republicans.  As Morton Horwitz puts it, 
“At the heart of the post-Revolutionary American constitutional system 
was the principle that all retroactive lawmaking was an interference 
16 See, e.g., Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 387-95 (opinion of Chase, J.) (discussing the 
nature of, and constitutional prohibition on, ex post facto laws); Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 
Wheat.) at 221 (“In every system of jurisprudence such [retrospective] laws are consi-
dered as contrary to the first principles of natural justice . . . .”). 
17 Scholars in a variety of disciplines have identified the period from the late eigh-
teenth to the early nineteenth century as witnessing significant transitions in European 
and American notions of time and temporality, from both a technological and an ideo-
logical perspective.  See generally THOMAS M. ALLEN, A REPUBLIC IN TIME:  TEMPORALITY 
AND SOCIAL IMAGINATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (2008) (exploring the 
changing conceptions of time in nineteenth-century American culture); LYNN HUNT, 
MEASURING TIME, MAKING HISTORY (2008) (describing nineteenth-century develop-
ments in the measurement of time, including the adoption of time zones; the adoption 
of Greenwich, England, as the source of the prime meridian; and changing philosoph-
ical attitudes toward history, modernity, and time); LEWIS MUMFORD, TECHNICS AND 
CIVILIZATION 196-99 (1934) (describing how the industrial revolution of the late eigh-
teenth century and nineteenth century increased emphasis on “the regimentation of 
time”); DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 149-86 (1984) (offering a philosophical 
account of personal identity across time); WILLIAM H. SEWELL JR., LOGICS OF HISTORY 
(2005) (examining the impact of history on the social sciences and describing chang-
ing conceptions of temporality); MARK M. SMITH, MASTERED BY THE CLOCK:  TIME, 
SLAVERY, AND FREEDOM IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH (1997) (describing clock time’s arriv-
al in, and influence on, the agricultural south during the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries); J. DAVID VELLEMAN, SELF TO SELF (2006) (examining temporal elements of 
personal identity emerging from Kantian ethics); Keith Tribe, Introduction to REINHART 
KOSELLECK, FUTURES PAST:  ON THE SEMANTICS OF HISTORICAL TIME, at x (Keith Tribe 
trans., 1985) (describing Koselleck’s denomination of the period between approx-
imately 1750 and 1850 as the “Sattelzeit,” or saddle-time); J.G.A. Pocock, Modes of Politi-
cal and Historical Time in Early Eighteenth-Century England (exploring the creation of 
“public time” in England during this period and describing how conceptions of time in 
eighteenth-century England shifted away from a belief that “time and its events were 
the creation of God”), in 5 STUDIES IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY CULTURE 87 (Ronald C. 
Rosbottom ed., 1976); E.P. Thompson, Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism, 
PAST & PRESENT, Dec. 1967, at 56 (analyzing how changes in the conception of time 
affected labor discipline and industrialization). 
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with property rights.”18  A version of this principle lay behind the Ex 
Post Facto and Contracts Clauses.  In construing these constitutional 
provisions, the Calder and Ogden decisions illustrate the connections 
between the idea of vested rights and contemporary notions about the 
nature of judicial and legislative power. 
A.  Calder v. Bull 
Calder occupies an unusual place in the constitutional law canon.  
Cases predating Marshall’s Chief Justiceship seem to fit awkwardly into 
the traditional story of a powerful, empire-building Court that steadily 
expanded judicial review into judicial supremacy.19  When Calder does 
make its way into casebooks, it is typically presented as an example of 
early American debates about higher law as a basis for judicial review 
and for the proposition that the Ex Post Facto Clause applies only to 
criminal statutes.20 
This is part of the story of Calder, to be sure, but not the whole sto-
ry.  The four seriatim opinions in the case do indeed display a variety 
of attitudes toward judicial review.  Taking a strong stance in favor of 
broad judicial authority, Justice Samuel Chase argued that “[a]n act of 
the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first 
principles of the social compact; cannot be considered a rightful ex-
ercise of legislative authority.”21  Justice James Iredell, in contrast, en-
dorsed a more modest vision of the role of courts.  Justice Iredell ar-
gued that if Congress or a state legislature “shall pass a law, within the 
general scope of their constitutional power, the Court cannot pro-
18 MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960, at 
149 (1992).  Of Calder specifically, Horwitz notes, “How could one bar all retroactive 
laws while still managing to avoid the absurd conclusion that every governmental ac-
tion that interferes with settled expectations is unconstitutional?”  Id. at 149-50. 
19 Robert McCloskey has made a similar point, noting that  
 [i]t is hard for a student of judicial review to avoid feeling that American 
constitutional history from 1789 to 1801 was marking time.  The great shadow 
of John Marshall . . . falls across our understanding of that first decade; and it 
has therefore the quality of a play’s opening moments with minor characters 
exchanging trivialities while they and the audience await the appearance of 
the star.   
ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 19 (Sanford Levinson ed., 4th 
ed. 2005).  McCloskey concludes that “[s]uch an impression is not altogether unjusti-
fied.”  Id. 
20 See, e.g., KERMIT L. HALL ET AL., AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 139 (3d ed. 2005) 
(describing the Calder decision as “the clearest and most definitive expression of high-
er-law doctrine to emanate from the United States Supreme Court”). 
21 Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 388 (opinion of Chase, J.) (emphases omitted). 
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nounce it to be void, merely because it is, in their judgment, contrary 
to the principles of natural justice.”22  Justices Chase and Iredell thus 
took different views of the basis on which the Court might invalidate 
legislation, and therefore of the scope of the Court’s claims to judicial 
review.23 
But to read Calder ahistorically, as a precursor to the Court’s ro-
bust claims of judicial review in Marbury v. Madison,24 is to ignore the 
case’s importance as one of the Court’s earliest meditations on tem-
porality.  Calder must be seen as a transitional case in which pre-
Revolutionary ideas about time and institutions were explicitly held to 
have ongoing significance for a constitutional order that expressed 
strong views on temporality, such as those underpinning the Ex Post 
Facto Clause.  In other words, Calder demonstrates that the temporal 
commitments of the new republic were integrally related to those of 
the previous Anglo-American legal regime.25 
The dispute in Calder centered on a resolution passed by the Con-
necticut legislature in 1795 that set aside the decree of a probate court 
and granted a new hearing in a will contest.26  The question for the 
Supreme Court was whether the Connecticut legislation was an ex 
post facto law and therefore unconstitutional.27  A unanimous Court 
held that the Connecticut legislation was not an ex post facto law and 
therefore permitted the resolution to stand. 
In reaching their decisions, the Justices focused on the extent of 
the Ex Post Facto Clause’s prohibition on retroactive legislation.  The 
plaintiffs in error had based their challenge to the Connecticut legis-
lation on the claim that “the awarding of a new trial, was the effect of 
a legislative act, and that it is unconstitutional, because an ex post fac-
to law.”28  The Justices appear to have been unmoved by this argu-
22 Id. at 399 (opinion of Iredell, J.). 
23 On judicial review in the period before Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 
137 (1803), see PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY ch. 13 (2008), which ex-
plores how judicial review manifested itself through discussions of judicial duty in early 
American law. 
24 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 137. 
25 One prominent example of this inter-regime continuity was the federal gov-
ernment’s assumption in 1790 of the states’ Revolutionary War debts.  See Claire Priest, 
Law and Commerce, 1580–1815 (describing Alexander Hamilton’s fiscal plans as Trea-
sury Secretary), in 1 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 400, 437-41 (Mi-
chael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008). 
26 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 386 (opinion of Chase, J.). 
27 Id. at 387. 
28 Id. at 396 (opinion of Paterson, J.) (italics omitted). 
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ment, holding instead that the Ex Post Facto Clause barred only crim-
inal, not civil, retrospective laws.29  All agreed that the prohibition on 
ex post facto lawmaking applied only in the criminal context, for only 
in those cases did a retroactive law rise to the level of interfering with 
settled expectations that Anglo-American law had traditionally asso-
ciated with ex post facto laws.30  Moreover, as Justice Chase noted, had 
the drafters of the Constitution intended the ex post facto ban to ex-
tend to civil cases, “the two prohibitions, not to make any thing but 
gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts; and not to pass any 
law impairing the obligation of contracts, were improper and unne-
cessary.”31 
For our purposes, the more interesting part of the decision was 
the debate among the Justices as to whether the Connecticut legisla-
ture’s act should be characterized as essentially legislative or judicial.  
Justice Iredell suggested that the legislature had behaved like a court 
by setting aside the probate court’s decree and ordering a new trial.  
The power of the legislature to “superintend the Courts of Jus-
tice . . . is judicial in its nature; and whenever it is exercised, as in the 
present instance, it is an exercise of judicial, not of legislative, authori-
ty,” Justice Iredell argued.32  Justices William Paterson and William 
Cushing, for their parts, allowed that it was an open question whether 
the act was judicial or legislative.33  Although the plaintiffs had not 
based their challenge to the legislature’s action on a claim that it was 
judicial in nature, the fact that three Justices considered this question 
suggests that the Court acknowledged some misgivings about this type 
29 See id. (“The words, ex post facto, when applied to a law, have a technical mean-
ing, and, in legal phraseology, refer to crimes, pains, and penalties.”).  
30 See id. at 391 (opinion of Chase, J.) (“Every ex post facto law must necessarily be 
retrospective; but every retrospective law is not an ex post facto law:  The former, only, 
are prohibited. . . . There is a great and apparent difference between making an un-
lawful act lawful; and the making an innocent action criminal, and punishing it as a 
crime.” (emphases omitted) (italics omitted)). 
31 Id. at 393.  As several scholars have pointed out, the neatness of the doctrinal 
rule that emerged from Calder obscures the fact that precedents existed in colonial and 
early national law for treating civil as well as criminal cases as susceptible to ex post fac-
to objections.  See 8 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES, 1789–1800, at 98 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1985) (discussing early national 
precedents for applying Ex Post Facto Clause to civil matters); 1 WILLIAM WINSLOW 
CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 
324-51 (1953) (arguing that the “true meaning” of the Ex Post Facto Clause extended 
to both civil and criminal matters). 
32 Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 398 (opinion of Iredell, J.). 
33 See id. at 395-96 (opinion of Paterson, J.); id. at 400-01 (opinion of Cushing, J.). 
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of institutional crossover, even at the level of state government.34  In-
deed, Justice Iredell’s statement that the Court could not invalidate 
legislation based only on a sense that it violated natural justice fol-
lowed just a few sentences after he pronounced the Connecticut legis-
lature’s action judicial, not legislative—a proximity that points toward 
a belief that legislatures acting like courts did in fact offend principles 
of natural justice.35 
Moreover, underlying Justice Iredell’s and Justice Paterson’s sug-
gestions that the Connecticut resolution amounted to a judicial act 
was an assumption about temporality—specifically, the appropriate 
temporal scope of different institutions’ actions.  This is the relevance 
of the vested-rights discussion:  the concern that, as Justice Chase put 
it, “the federal or state legislatures will pass laws to deprive citizens of 
rights vested in them by existing laws . . . .”36  Ex post facto criminal 
laws were understood to be clear violations of vested rights in the most 
fundamental sense—i.e., takings of the person—and, as such, the Jus-
tices considered them to be the intended target of the language in Ar-
ticle I, Sections 9 and 10.  But the Justices’ opinions demonstrate that 
they were also uneasy with ex post facto civil laws based on a belief 
that the rights of individuals were imperiled when legislatures acted 
like courts by granting retroactive relief.  The Court’s discussion of 
vested rights signals an inquiry into the temporal effect of legal action, 
in particular, action by a legislature.  As the Marshall Court would lat-
er emphasize in cases such as Fletcher v. Peck37 and Trustees of Dartmouth 
College v. Woodward,38 the Court in this period was troubled by the 
prospect of legislatures reaching back to invalidate settled distribu-
34 Such mixing of legislative and judicial functions by a legislature would later be-
come a red flag to the Court in separation of powers and delegation cases.  Take, for 
example, Justice Powell’s reasoning in INS v. Chadha:  
 On its face, the House’s action appears clearly adjudicatory.  The House [of 
Representatives] did not enact a general rule; rather it made its own determi-
nation that six specific persons did not comply with certain statutory crite-
ria. . . .   
 The impropriety of the House’s assumption of this function is confirmed by 
the fact that its action raises the very danger the Framers sought to avoid—the 
exercise of unchecked power. 
462 U.S. 919, 964-66 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring).  
35 See Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 398-99 (opinion of Iredell, J.). 
36 Id. at 394 (opinion of Chase, J.) (emphases omitted). 
37 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) (invalidating a Georgia law repealing prior land 
sales by the state). 
38 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819) (invalidating the New Hampshire legislature’s 
efforts to substantially alter the college’s charter). 
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tions of property and contract rights among private parties.  In 1798, 
the Justices demonstrated a version of this unease by asking whether a 
civil ex post facto law amounted to a judicial act and was therefore 
beyond the scope of a legislature’s power. 
Given the Justices’ shared sense that the Connecticut legislature 
had wandered into the province of the judiciary by ordering a new will 
hearing, what explains their willingness to uphold the legislature’s ac-
tion?  Even allowing that separation-of-powers concerns are more of 
an obsession for modern constitutional law than they were in the early 
Republic, the repeated references in the Calder opinions to the dis-
tinction between legislative and judicial power suggest that to ask this 
question is not to project modern concerns backward onto an earlier 
period.  The Justices in Calder seem to be saying, “Yes, what the Con-
necticut legislature is doing looks judicial, and that seems potentially 
problematic, but we will permit it.”  The reason for this indulgent atti-
tude lay in what Justice Iredell termed “the established usage of Con-
necticut.”39  As Justice Paterson explained, 
The Constitution of Connecticut is made up of usages, and it appears 
that its Legislature have, from the beginning, exercised the power of 
granting new trials. . . . And the fact is, that the Legislature have, in two 
instances, exercised this power since the passing of the law [creating the 
superior and county courts] in 1762. . . . [I]t appears, that the Legisla-
ture, or general court of Connecticut, originally possessed, and exercised 
all legislative, executive, and judicial authority . . . .
40
 
Indeed, during the colonial period, provincial assemblies had regular-
ly exercised what would now be considered judicial power; one need 
only consider that the Massachusetts legislature is still called “the 
General Court” to see the lasting effect of this mixing of powers on 
current institutions.41 
This deference to custom and usage lies at the heart of Calder’s 
significance as a transitional case.  The opinions are striking in that 
39 Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 398 (opinion of Iredell, J.) (italics omitted). 
40 Id. at 395 (opinion of Paterson, J.) (italics omitted). 
41 See Mark DeWolfe Howe & Louis F. Eaton, Jr., The Supreme Judicial Power in the 
Colony of Massachusetts Bay, 20 NEW ENG. Q. 291, 294 (1947) (discussing the fact that 
the “General Court” traditionally considered legislative, judicial, and executive mat-
ters); see also CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, THE HIGH COURT OF PARLIAMENT AND ITS 
SUPREMACY, at viii (1910) (describing the medieval English Parliament as having “both 
‘legislated’ and ‘adjudicated,’” although “until modern times no clear distinction was 
perceived between these two kinds of activity”); Barbara A. Black, The Constitution of 
Empire:  The Case for the Colonists, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1157, 1168 (1976) (discussing the 
changing nature of Parliament between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries from 
king’s council to legislature). 
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they show the Justices consciously mediating between the colonial 
constitutional order and the new order established in 1789.  In con-
trast to the common image of the early Court as operating on a blank 
slate, and looking only to the Constitution for guidance, Calder de-
monstrates the degree to which colonial practice influenced early re-
publican law. 
Calder is thus a transitional case in two ways:  first, for defining in-
stitutional action, and second, for illustrating the Court’s working-out 
of how it ought to treat pre-1789 constitutional custom and usage.42  
In the context of institutional action, the decisions demonstrate that 
the institutional temporal connection between, on the one hand, leg-
islatures operating prospectively, and on the other hand, courts oper-
ating retroactively, was beginning to harden but had not yet set.  
Hence, the case exhibits a combination of unease with the Connecti-
cut legislature’s action and a grasp at colonial custom and usage as a 
way of avoiding the bigger issues the case presented. 
The question of how the new republican legal regime ought to 
treat pre-1789 judicial decisions and legislation is manifest in Calder 
and may account for the odd place that the case occupies in American 
constitutional law.43  Other than its holding that the Ex Post Facto 
Clause applies only in the criminal context, the case seems like an out-
lier, a relic of a particular moment when another regime’s law had to 
be taken into account.  But if we historicize the case, looking at it on 
its own terms, it has much to tell us about how the Court in its earliest 
days understood the range of possibilities that were open to it as it at-
tempted to harmonize a vast body of Anglo-American customary and 
common law with the principles set forth in the new constitution.  In 
Calder, the Court chose to privilege the practice of the previous re-
gime over any potential bar that the new regime’s founding document 
might present to those practices.  The fact that such a choice required 
the Court to overlook possible separation of powers problems—or 
even beliefs about the appropriate division of power between courts 
and legislatures that might have been more accessible at that time—
42 Cf. WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW 8 -10 (1975) 
(discussing early Americans’ self-conscious efforts to incorporate some but not all as-
pects of English common law into the U.S. legal system). 
43 On the issue of the law’s operation in moments of transition, see Toby J. Hey-
tens, Managing Transitional Moments in Criminal Cases, 115 YALE L.J. 922 (2006); Eric A. 
Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice, 117 HARV. L. REV. 761 
(2004); Richard A. Primus, The Riddle of Hiram Revels, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1680 (2006); 
and see generally Symposium, Legal Transitions:  Is There an Ideal Way to Deal with the 
Non-Ideal World of Legal Change?, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1 (2003). 
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demonstrates the common law mentality of the early Court, and the 
underlying conviction that the relevant temporal baseline for the 
common law originated well before 1789.44  Thus, colonial custom and 
usage (and the underlying colonial constitution that informed them) 
outweighed the Calder Court’s evident discomfort with allowing a state 
legislature to behave in such a court-like manner. 
The decision in Calder thus illustrates the Court’s early interest in 
investigating questions of laws’ origins.  Rather than treating the Con-
necticut legislature’s action as entirely a separation of powers issue or 
as a mechanical question of legislative retroactivity, the Court under-
took a two-tiered analysis, considering both the timeframe of the re-
gime that created the legislative act and the temporal effect of the act 
itself.  Justice Chase’s and Justice Iredell’s opinions in particular raised 
the issue of origins writ large by analyzing the relationship between 
the institutional capacities of courts and legislatures in the old empire 
and the new Republic, as well as the appropriate contours of judicial 
review in the wake of the transition from a system of parliamentary so-
vereignty to one based on the higher law of a constitution.  In addi-
tion to these metaorigins questions, the Court also considered the 
more workaday question of the common law origins of the Connecti-
cut legislature’s power to order a new hearing in a will contest.  The 
Court’s temporal analysis in Calder, in other words, was bound up in 
its quest to legitimize the new regime as well as to reach the proper 
common law result. 
B.  Ogden v. Saunders 
Discomfort with retroactive legislation persisted after Calder had 
settled the issue of the scope of the ex post facto ban.  In the early 
decades of the nineteenth century, the Court wielded the Contracts 
Clause as a kind of “civil anti-retroactivity provision.”45  Yet there were 
limits to the impediments the Court was willing to place in the way of 
legislatures.  As Justice Chase had noted in Calder, a literal construc-
tion of the ex post facto prohibition that “prohibit[ed] the 
44 Cf. David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 
877, 879 (1996) (arguing that the common law approach of constitutional interpreta-
tion, which looks to evolving legal standards over time rather than to any particular 
authoritative source, provides a better explanation of American practices of constitu-
tional interpretation than textualism or originalism). 
45 See HORWITZ, supra note 18, at 150 (“[T]he more important aspect of the vested 
rights doctrine was that it enabled courts to avoid the reductio ad absurdum that every 
change in legal rules constituted an interference with property rights.”). 
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enact[ment of] any law after a fact” would “greatly restrict the power 
of the federal and state legislatures; and the consequences of such a 
construction may not be foreseen.”46  In the subsequent decades, the 
Court drew on the vested rights doctrine in an attempt to limn a 
boundary between widespread civil antiretroactivity on one hand and 
neutralizing the Contracts Clause on the other.47 
The centerpiece of this balancing act was the Court’s doctrine on 
state bankruptcy laws.  In two cases, Sturges v. Crowninshield48 and Ogden 
v. Saunders,49 the Court considered the question whether the Contracts 
Clause forbade states from passing laws discharging insolvent debtors.  
In Sturges, the law at issue was a New York statute that discharged the 
debtor from debts incurred prior to the law’s passage.50  Chief Justice 
Marshall, writing for the Court, held that the statute violated the Con-
tracts Clause.51  The opinion was not Marshall’s clearest, but at a min-
imum, the retroactive nature of the New York statute appeared to of-
fend the Court: 
The principle was the inviolability of contracts.  This principle was to be 
protected in whatsoever form it might be assailed. . . . The plain and 
simple declaration, that no State shall pass any law impairing the obliga-
tion of contracts, includes insolvent laws and all other laws, so far as they 
infringe the principle the Convention intended to hold sacred, and no 
farther.
52
 
Sturges resulted in great uncertainty on two issues:  first, whether 
the states might pass bankruptcy laws at all, or whether this was an 
area of exclusive federal power; second, whether the New York law at 
issue was unconstitutional because of its retroactive application.  Both 
these issues came before the Court eight years later in Ogden v. Saund-
ers, which involved a challenge to another New York insolvency act.53  
Ogden placed the temporal-effect question squarely before the Court:  
did an insolvency law that applied only to contracts made after the law 
was passed violate the Contracts Clause, or did such a law become in-
corporated into those contracts as an implied term?54  That is, was the 
46 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 393 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.) (emphases omitted). 
47 See HORWITZ, supra note 18, at 150 (discussing the role of the vested rights doc-
trine). 
48 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819). 
49 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827). 
50 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 122. 
51 Id. at 206-08. 
52 Id. at 200 . 
53 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 215. 
54 Id. at 243-44. 
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Court’s objection to the earlier New York law in Sturges based on its re-
troactive application, or on some broader conviction that bankruptcy 
laws by their very nature ran afoul of the Contracts Clause? 
The Court in Ogden returned to its pre-Marshall practice of issuing 
seriatim opinions, a marker of the deep divisions among the Justices 
that the case revealed.  Justices Bushrod Washington, William John-
son, Smith Thompson, and Robert Trimble held the New York law to 
be valid, putting to rest the questions that had lingered since Sturges 
regarding the states’ power to legislate in the bankruptcy area and the 
appropriate temporal effect of such laws.  In Ogden, Justice Washing-
ton wrote: 
  [W]hich ever way we turn, whether to laws affecting the validity, con-
struction, or discharges of contracts, or the evidence or remedy to be 
employed in enforcing them, we are met by this overruling and admitted 
distinction; between those which operate retrospectively, and those 
which operate prospectively.  In all of them, the law is pronounced to be 
void in the first class of cases, and not so in the second.
55
 
Working through the Contracts Clause analysis, the majority 
placed great weight on the Constitution’s use of the phrase “impairing 
the Obligation of Contracts” rather than simply “impairing contracts” 
in describing the prohibited activity.  The inclusion of the word “obli-
gation,” Justice Washington argued, made the prohibition apply only 
to laws affecting contracts already made—e.g., retroactive bankruptcy 
laws.56  Had the Article I language referred simply to “impairing con-
tracts,” then the restriction would have extended to prospective laws 
as well, since under such analysis “the agreement of the parties . . . 
would be impaired as much by a prior as it would be by a subsequent 
bankrupt[cy] law.”57  Justice Washington concluded, however, that the 
states would not have stood for such a broad restraint on their own 
power at the time of ratification.58  Moreover, the prospective opera-
tion of the statute meant that it became part of every subsequent con-
tract and so could not be regarded as impairing obligations under 
those contracts.59 
55 Id. at 262 (opinion of Washington, J.). 
56 Id. at 269.   
57 Id. 
58 See id. (“[T]he extensive operation [of such a broad restraint on state pow-
er] . . . would have hazarded, to say the least of it, the adoption of the constitution by 
the State conventions.”). 
59 Id. at 260. 
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Writing for a trio of dissenters that included Justices Joseph Story 
and Gabriel Duvall, Chief Justice Marshall argued that the New York 
act was invalid and that the majority’s prospective-retroactive distinc-
tion was misguided.60  The majority’s theory that the New York law op-
erated only prospectively was erroneous, Marshall argued, because his 
brother Justices had looked to the wrong temporal frame for analyz-
ing how the law operated.  The view that the insolvency statute oper-
ated only prospectively assumed that the relative moment of operation 
was the time of the act’s passage; on such a view, the only constitu-
tionally impermissible bankruptcy laws were those that sought to 
reach debts contracted prior to the act’s passage.  But Marshall con-
tended that the relevant moment of operation for the statute was “not 
the time of the passage of the act, but of its action on the contract.”61  
On that analysis, any application of an insolvency law would necessari-
ly implicate the preexisting debts of that particular debtor.  In Mar-
shall’s view, the state’s discharge of such debts amounted to interfe-
rence with the obligations of contract, and therefore meant that the 
statute was unconstitutional.62 
According to the Chief Justice’s view, the drafting of a contract 
should be understood as distinct from the legal regime in which that 
drafting took place.  Marshall argued that permitting bankruptcy laws 
that operated prospectively according to the majority’s view would al-
low a state to pass legislation “declaring that all contracts should be 
subject to legislative control, and should be discharged as the legisla-
ture might prescribe.”63  Such an analysis would eviscerate the protec-
tions that the Contracts Clause was intended to afford to private par-
ties.  The availability of these protections did not depend on the 
categorization of a particular state law as retroactive or prospective, 
Marshall claimed; Contracts Clause analysis should not become simply 
60 Id. at 336-37 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting). 
61 Id. at 337; cf. Kermit Roosevelt III, A Little Theory Is a Dangerous Thing:  The Myth 
of Adjudicative Retroactivity, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1075, 1115-16 (1999) (distinguishing be-
tween “transaction-time” and “decision-time” models of retroactivity). 
62 Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 337 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting). 
63 Id. at 339.  Marshall’s forecast proved accurate in a slightly different context.  
Following the Court’s decision in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat.) 518 (1819), that a state legislature’s modification of a charter amounted to 
impairment of the obligation of contracts, some states enacted statutes or constitution-
al provisions that expressly reserved to the state the power to amend corporate char-
ters, while other states included such reservations in individual charters.  See STANLEY I. 
KUTLER, PRIVILEGE AND CREATIVE DESTRUCTION: THE CHARLES RIVER BRIDGE CASE 62-
63 (1971); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815–
1835, at 627 (1988). 
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an inquiry into an act’s temporal framework.  The majority’s construc-
tion “would change the character of the provision, and convert an in-
hibition to pass laws impairing the obligation of contracts, into an in-
hibition to pass retrospective laws.”64  Finally, the fact that the 
Contracts Clause was grouped with the prohibitions on bills of at-
tainder and ex post facto laws should not be read to confound the ob-
viously retrospective nature of those devices with the less temporally 
delimited restriction on impairing the obligation of contracts.65 
Despite Marshall’s claims that his view did not depend on the re-
troactive/prospective distinction, his emphasis on selecting the rele-
vant moment for purposes of the Contracts Clause inquiry demon-
strates the importance of temporal framing for his analysis.  The 
majority argued that concerns of notice and fairness were satisfied by 
the New York law in Ogden in a way that had not been the case in 
Sturges, insofar as the Ogden law applied only to contracts made after 
the law was passed.  Thus, unlike the Sturges scenario, a creditor was 
presumed to be on notice that the debtor might turn to the state insol-
vency law for relief; this was the insight behind the majority’s assertion 
that the law in effect at the time of the contract’s creation was incorpo-
rated into the contract itself.  For the majority Justices, the passage of 
the insolvency statute could be plotted at time one and applied to all 
subsequent contracts plotted further down the temporal line. 
Marshall, in contrast, took a less distinctly chronological view of 
the relevant events.  For the Chief Justice, each creditor-debtor inte-
raction subject to the insolvency act contained its own temporal dy-
namics and relationships.  A one-time announcement by the state leg-
islature that subsequent debts might be discharged was insufficient to 
cure the impairments that took place in each creditor-debtor relation-
ship as the insolvency law was applied with respect to those particular 
debts.  To put it another way, consider that even the nominally “pros-
pective” act at issue in Ogden operated retroactively with respect to any 
particular creditor-debtor relationship, in that it permitted a debtor to 
escape liability for his debts by virtue of the operation of state law.  
True, the statute in Ogden was not maximally retroactive, since it did 
not apply to debts entered into prior to the act’s passage, as had the 
64 Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 355-56 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting); see also HOR-
WITZ, supra note 18, at 151 (noting Marshall’s view that “all state bankruptcy laws, 
whether they operated on past or future contracts, were unconstitutional.  Marshall 
maintained that virtually all established expectations, including the expectation of the 
power to contract in the future, were vested property rights”). 
65 Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 335-36 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting). 
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law in Sturges.  Viewed from the temporal frame of the legal and eco-
nomic system, then, the Ogden act operated only prospectively.  But 
the law nevertheless permitted a significant degree of retroactivity 
within a given creditor-debtor grouping when the debtor’s request for 
relief brought her prior contracts under the state’s protection. 
Under the Ogden statute, then, each creditor-debtor relationship 
contained a potential before-and-after dynamic, with the contractual 
basis of the relationship functioning very differently after a debtor 
sought protection than it had before that moment.  According to 
Marshall’s robust view of the Contracts Clause, this was where the real 
concern regarding the impairment of the obligations of contract lay—
not in setting up the wrong chronology of legislative action and pri-
vate contract, but in the potential for legislative action suddenly to en-
ter into and upset particular contracts. 
The opinions in Ogden thus articulated distinctive views of which 
temporal frameworks counted for purposes of Contracts Clause analy-
sis.  Despite this divergence, the Justices appear to have shared a deep 
belief in judicial supremacy for assessing questions of time.  As was al-
so the case in Calder, the Court in Ogden presented itself as the final 
authority on issues of temporal effect, especially with respect to legis-
lation.  This judicial imperialism where questions of time were con-
cerned continued into the twentieth century, when the Court 
launched an extensive body of retroactivity doctrine—this time refer-
ring to the temporal effect of the Court’s own decisions. 
II.  JUDICIAL RETROACTIVITY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
The special relationship between the Supreme Court and time is 
evident in the modern Court’s doctrine on the problem of retroactive 
application of judicial decisions, a complex issue that has forced the 
Court self-consciously to confront the relationship between adjudica-
tion and time.66 
This Part examines the Court’s experiments in the twentieth cen-
tury with limiting the retroactive effect of its own decisions.  The doc-
trine of adjudicative retroactivity67 dates from the Court’s efforts in the 
66 My use of the phrase “the problem of retroactive application” is not meant to 
suggest that retroactivity itself is the heart of the problem; the real problem for the 
Court has been the distinction between retroactivity and prospectivity.  On these 
terms, see generally Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change:  An Equilibrium Approach, 
110 HARV. L. REV. 1055 (1997), which discusses the Court’s struggles with retroactivity 
doctrine.   
67 This Part does not explore the related but distinct issue of legislative retroactivi-
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1960s to claim greater discretion to control the application of its deci-
sions, especially in the criminal context.68  Many commentators have 
criticized this effort as resulting in “doctrinal confusion and incohe-
rence.”69 
Regardless of their holdings, the majority of the Supreme Court’s 
cases dealing with adjudicative retroactivity view the choice of retroac-
tivity as implicating the dichotomy between what the Court has 
termed the Blackstonian or “declaratory” model of law70 and the Aus-
tinian or “positive law” model.71  The Court has described the declara-
tory theory as a claim that “[t]he judge rather than being the creator 
of the law [is] but its discoverer,”72 and that therefore “the courts are 
understood only to find the law, not to make it.”73  The theory forms 
one of the central justifications for adjudicative retroactivity:  if the 
ty.  See, e.g., United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 32 (1994) (holding that due process 
was not violated by retroactive application of an amendment to the Internal Revenue 
Code); General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 187, 191 (1992) (upholding 
retroactive regulatory legislation against Due Process and Contracts Clause chal-
lenges); Fisch, supra note 66, at 1063-66 (describing the Court’s decisions regarding 
legislative retroactivity); Harold J. Krent, The Puzzling Boundary Between Criminal and 
Civil Retroactive Lawmaking, 84 GEO. L.J. 2143, 2145 (1996) (arguing that the Court’s 
different treatment of retroactivity in the criminal and civil contexts is due to interest 
group theory); cf. John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 100 CO-
LUM. L. REV. 399 (2010) (offering a critique of approaches that treat nonretroactivity 
as a canonical constitutional value). 
68 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and 
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1738 (1991) (“The Warren Court con-
fronted the question of retroactivity in criminal cases while embarked on a fundamen-
tal restructuring of constitutional doctrines regulating criminal procedure.”). 
69 See Roosevelt, supra note 61, at 1136-37 (arguing that the current Court has 
been “partially successful” at clarifying the Warren Court’s retroactivity doctrine). 
70 See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *69-70 (explaining that the duty of courts is 
not to “pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one”).  Although 
the Court generally refers to Blackstone as the “foremost exponent” of the declaratory 
theory, it occasionally also cites Sir Matthew Hale’s earlier HISTORY OF THE COMMON 
LAW, first published in 1713.  See, e.g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 623 n.7 
(1965) (referring to SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENG-
LAND (Charles M. Gray ed., Univ. Chicago Press 1971) (1713)). 
71 See 1 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 35-37 (Robert Campbell ed., 
London, John Murray 4th ed. 1873) (examining declaratory and positive law theories);  
see also Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 623-24 (“Austin maintained that judges do in fact do 
something more than discover law; they make it interstitially by filling in with judicial 
interpretation the vague, indefinite, or generic statutory or common-law terms that 
alone are but the empty crevices of the law.”).  The Linkletter Court’s characterization 
of this view as associated with Austin has been called “somewhat unconventional[].”  
Paul J. Mishkin, The Supreme Court 1964 Term—Foreword:  The High Court, The Great Writ, 
and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 58 (1965). 
72 Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 623. 
73 James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 535-36 (1990). 
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Court is declaring what the law is and has always been, then that dec-
laration must have been the case at all earlier times, even if contem-
porary case law suggests otherwise.  On this view, retroactive applica-
tion ought to be regarded as “fixing” old mistakes and bringing the 
doctrine into line with the correct rule.  The Austinian theory, in con-
trast, posits a more creative role for judges, carrying with it an assump-
tion that “when the Court changes its mind, the law changes with it.”74  
Generally understood to provide for an exclusively forward-looking 
dynamic, this view is most often marshaled in defense of prospective 
application.  It does not contemplate courts correcting the mistakes of 
the past; on the contrary, the overruling is understood to affect only 
those cases that have yet to be decided. 
Quaint though the invocation of Blackstone as jurisprudential au-
thority has become, one should not simply dismiss the declaratory 
theory as an anachronistic relic of a less sophisticated era.  As Paul 
Mishkin pointed out, judicial decisions necessarily operate with some 
degree of retroactivity, given that the fundamental duty of courts is to 
decide disputes that have already arisen.75  Moreover, these decisions 
must reflect preexisting shared societal rules or values; otherwise, re-
troactivity would be an “intolerable” imposition of new rules on prior 
conduct.76  In other words, the idea that there exists some body of as 
yet unarticulated—but nonetheless viable—law is implicit in the prac-
tice of retroactive application, regardless of one’s views on Blackstone.  
We cite Blackstone historiographically:  not for the truth of what he 
thought but as evidence of the centrality of the declaratory theory to 
Anglo-American common law. 
Although the declaratory/positivist distinction does not complete-
ly capture the nuances of the retroactivity question, it does raise sever-
al thorny issues that touch on the underlying meaning of the Court’s 
power to overrule a prior judgment.  Clearly, the theories contem-
plate different conceptions of the act of overruling.  The positivist’s 
claimed ability to make law means that her decision to overrule 
creates a new law in and of itself, while the declaratory theorist’s striv-
74 Id. at 550 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
75 See Mishkin, supra note 71, at 60 (“[I]t is the basic role of courts to decide dis-
putes after they have arisen.  That function requires that judicial decisions oper-
ate . . . with retroactive effect.”). 
76 See id. (“[U]nless [judicial] decisions . . . reflect preexisting rules or values, such 
retroactivity would be intolerable.”).  Indeed, a completely prospective judicial deci-
sion—one that did not apply to the parties before the court—would likely run afoul of 
the constitutional prohibition on advisory opinions. 
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ing toward a preordained perfection means that the act of overruling 
is a corrective device aimed at purging the law of a deviant wrong 
turn.  In other words, the positivist concerns herself with making each 
law complete and correct in itself, while the declaratory theorist sees 
his role as that of custodian of a holistic law in danger of being tainted 
by momentary expediency.  The Austinian makes no claim to having 
better or more “right” knowledge than her predecessors; what worked 
before simply does not work today, and rather than deeming one ap-
proach fundamentally wrong, she accepts the existence of conflicting 
articulations of the law because they are separated by the passage of 
time.  The Blackstonian, in contrast, sees his judgment as the most 
perfect articulation (to date) of a single section of the great firma-
ment of the law, only one piece of which is visible at any given mo-
ment.  Under either approach, the court is clearly mediating between 
two points in time—namely, the point before we had discovered (the 
declaratory view) or created (the positivist view) the new incarnation 
of the law and the point after that discovery or creation.77 
Even without the additional complication of a law’s situation in 
time, the act of overruling is itself fraught with theoretical complexity.  
Outside the retroactivity debate, the practice of judicial overruling is 
the subject of significant controversy with respect to both its limits and 
its implications for stare decisis and the rule of law.78  With the addi-
tion of the retroactivity variable, the fundamental question of the 
meaning of overruling becomes more urgent, requiring the Court not 
only to overcome the hurdle of overturning an area of law thought to 
be settled but also to determine whether its actions should be charac-
terized as negation or as something less permanent and more benign, 
77 This is, to be sure, a highly schematized version of the two views.  As the writings 
of the Revolutionary-era American lawyer James Otis demonstrate, even during the 
heyday of Blackstone and Austin few people adopted one or the other view categorical-
ly.  Compare Otis’s statement in 1764 that “[t]he power of Parliament is uncontrolla-
ble but by themselves, and we must obey” with his observation in the same pamphlet 
that “Parliament cannot make 2 and 2, 5:  omnipotency cannot do it.”  JAMES OTIS, 
THE RIGHTS OF THE BRITISH COLONIES ASSERTED AND PROVED 59, 70-71 (Boston, Edes 
& Gill 1764) reprinted in 1 PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1750–1776, at 
409, 448, 454 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1965). 
78 See, e.g., OLIVER P. FIELD, THE EFFECT OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE ch. 6 
(1935) (considering the stare decisis and res judicata difficulties presented by overrul-
ing the law); Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029, 1034 
(1990) (discussing the tension between philosophy and the legal practice of adhering 
to precedent); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 604-05 (1987) (ar-
guing that precedent ought to constrain the decisions of “institutions of restraint,” but 
not “institutions of progress”). 
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such as suspension.  One’s view of the status of an overruled decision 
thus depends on one’s attitude toward retroactivity. 
The Court has at times embraced a maximalist version of retroac-
tivity.  On this view, “[a]n unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers 
no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no 
office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had 
never been passed.”79  In line with the declaratory theory, this view 
proceeds from the assumption that the most recent discovery of the 
law80 is the most correct one, the one closest to a transcendent body of 
law.  Therefore, if this new interpretation contradicts an earlier one, 
the earlier one is per se illegitimate for the simple reason that it would 
not otherwise have needed to be revisited and amended.  If the earlier 
interpretation is illegitimate now, it has necessarily always been illegi-
timate, for according to the baseline presumption of the declaratory 
theory, the law is unchanging.  Thus, the earlier statement of the law 
becomes a misstatement—a nullity that at this point is declared never 
to have been law—and the new articulation is held to be the true re-
presentation of the law.81  In this sense, the declaratory theory rejects 
79 Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886). 
80 Although both Norton and the example of the Attorney General’s opinion, dis-
cussed infra in note 84 and its accompanying text, both deal explicitly with the overrul-
ing of a statute rather than an earlier Court decision, the basic points about the effect 
of a finding of unconstitutionality remain the same.  In both cases, the issue is the 
reach of the Court’s finding, not the retroactivity or prospectivity of the statute as it was 
passed. 
81 The declaratory theory creates, but never satisfactorily resolves, a lingering am-
biguity:  what if courts are mistaken in their “discovery” the law?  The whole theory 
rides on the idea that each decision represents a new and accurate statement of the 
law, but what happens if there is a “right” law in existence and the courts simply fail to 
articulate it correctly, or to apprehend it at all?  
 Also unclear is the status of the law in the time between the earlier, now-
discredited judgment and the new, corrected one.  As a historical matter, the status of 
the law in that time was what it was:  people depended on the earlier decision because 
at that time they had no way of knowing that it would someday be superseded and de-
clared erroneous.  Certainly this is the desired effect, for otherwise the declaratory 
theory would not permit any law to be relied upon or accorded full legitimacy because 
there would always be the possibility of overruling at some later point in time—and 
along with overruling, the possibility of total nullification.  Yet from the momentary, 
synchronic standpoint of human time, the status of the law in that time can only be 
determined in its static relationship to a later temporal vantage point.  That is to say, in 
Norton, the earlier law was good law as long as the vantage point predates the particular 
moment in 1886 when the Norton decision was handed down; from that point onward, 
the earlier law was a nonentity.  Further concentric circles of confusion arise if one 
considers a scenario in which, 150 years after the Norton decision, the Court finds that 
the 1886 decision was mistaken and the earlier law was actually correct.  Now what 
would be the essential state of the law between the initial act and the 1886 decision?  
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efforts to historicize judicial decisions insofar as those efforts view de-
cisions as emerging from a particular temporal context. 
Prospective application of judicial decisions operates on a differ-
ent set of premises.  In an opinion concerning the status of the Dis-
trict of Columbia’s minimum wage law in 1937, following the overrul-
ing of Adkins v. Children’s Hospital 82 by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,83 
Attorney General Homer Cummings noted that 
[t]he decisions are practically in accord in holding that the courts have 
no power to repeal or abolish a statute, and that notwithstanding a deci-
sion holding it unconstitutional a statute continues to remain on the sta-
tute books; and that if a statute be declared unconstitutional and the de-
cision so declaring it be subsequently overruled the statute will then be 
held valid from the date it became effective.
84
 
Cummings thus suggested that although the D.C. minimum wage law 
had been ruled unconstitutional in Adkins in 1923, when the Court 
reversed Adkins in 1937 in West Coast Hotel, it in essence revived the 
D.C. law, which had lain dormant in a kind of fourteen-year legislative 
suspended animation.  In a prospective universe, therefore, judicial 
time moves forward in fits and starts, punctuated by repeated revisits 
to and reinterpretations of earlier moments.  In contrast to the decla-
ratory theory’s gradual emergence of a preexisting law, the positivist 
theory implies the rejection of a progressive, evolutionary view of 
time.  Rather than denying the possibility of fundamental legal 
change, the positivist theory embraces change but characterizes it as a 
series of doings, undoings, and redoings. 
In addition to deemphasizing chronological time, the declaratory 
and positivist theories share another important assumption:  a vision 
of legal change that privileges the moment of judicial decision and 
transforms that moment into a dividing line between old and new un-
derstandings of the law.  Shifting the emphasis from a more historical 
view of change in which each decision must be comprehended as both 
a slice across its own time and a section of the path of the law forward 
in time, both theories turn the gaze inward by suggesting, first, that 
each act of adjudication creates a division between the world before 
Between 1886 and 2036?  Perhaps more important, what was the real-life state of the 
law in those periods, during which no one had any idea that the rule they knew as law 
would later be deemed incorrect? 
82  261 U.S. 525, 558 (1923) (striking down a District of Columbia minimum wage 
statute because it “arbitrarily” shifted a societal burden to employers). 
83  300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding a state law setting a minimum wage for female 
employees). 
84  39 Op. Att’y Gen. 22, 22-23 (1937). 
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and after, and, second, that this confrontation between old and new 
requires a theory of assimilation. 
In this sense, the retroactivity/prospectivity analysis in the adjudi-
cation context resembles two points and a betweenness, a Time One 
and a Time Two with an interval of uncertainty between them.85  The 
initial decision emerges at Time One, but at Time Two we learn that the 
earlier decision is incomplete and requires additional explication with 
respect to the temporal effect of its reach.  Remedying this problem 
gives rise to another double dynamic, for the sweep of time now in-
cludes the original decision, the secondary decision recasting that de-
cision, and the reformulated original decision; in addition to the rela-
tionship between Time One  and Time Two, there is now a relationship 
between Time Two  and Time One Revisited.  But, rather unsurprisingly, 
this does not capture the full complexity of the new pair, for in spite 
of the ordinal precedence its name suggests, Time One Revisited actual-
ly comes after Time Two.  Try as it might, Time One Revisited can never 
negate the interim between the original Time One and Time Two; ra-
ther, it must be content with creating a “new” Time One whose exis-
tence is contingent on the fact of Time Two’s having occurred.  This is 
the case regardless of whether retroactive or prospective application is 
embraced at Time Two, for ultimately retroactivity doctrine unravels, 
not as a result of the temporal application the Court selects, but ra-
ther because of the impossibility of extracting the doctrine from the 
spirals of time between original and secondary decision. 
Both retroactivity and prospectivity therefore posit a measuring 
moment, for both require a definite point relative to which the cho-
sen temporal effect will operate.  Yet the Court’s retroactivity doctrine 
dodges the issue of providing a consistent account of this baseline 
point against which both past and future are to be defined.  Thus, one 
cannot say with certainty whether the fundamental moment in which 
the case revealed its true nature came at the time of the original deci-
sion or at the time of a later holding that the original decision would 
or would not apply retroactively; one only perceives in Time Two that 
85 In some situations, as in the Adkins–West Coast Hotel scenario, the Court must 
take three moments into account when considering the temporal effect of a series of 
its decisions:  an initial Time One in which a statute is passed (e.g., the D.C. minimum 
wage law), followed by Time Two in which the Court determines the validity of the sta-
tute (Adkins, striking down the statute), followed by Time Three in which the Court revi-
sits that earlier determination (West Coast Hotel, overruling Adkins). 
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the two cases are necessarily related by virtue of the fact that each is 
incomplete without the other.86 
Although the Court emphasizes temporal relativity in its retroac-
tivity doctrine, the Court functions in historical, chronological time 
owing to its institutional character.  Yet the Court’s self-conception 
centers on continuity, most notably the conviction that the body de-
ciding today’s cases is the same entity as the one that convened in New 
York’s Royal Exchange on February 2, 1790.87  The Court’s own vision 
of itself as an institution is thus largely ahistorical, suggesting a mode 
of judicial time characterized not by change but by continuity. 
For most of its early history, the Court adhered to a general rule 
of adjudicative retroactivity:  its decisions operated both forward and 
backward in time.88  In the nineteenth century, a few cases arose—
dealing with nonconstitutional, noncriminal state law—in which the 
Court deviated from its traditional path and declared a prospective 
rule.89  In the early twentieth century, prospective overruling received 
serious attention from judges and legal theorists.  Justice Benjamin 
Cardozo was a prominent proponent of prospectivity in certain cate-
gories of cases.90  In Great Northern Railway Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refin-
86 See, e.g., Roosevelt, supra note 61, at 1117-18 (distinguishing the decision-time 
model, in which courts apply the law as understood at the time the case is decided, and 
the transaction-time model, in which the law at the time of the transaction is applied). 
87 For example, in United States v. Lopez, the Court’s 1995 decision that revived 
judicial scrutiny of congressional action under the Commerce Clause, the Court listed 
nearly a century’s worth of case law in describing the “wide variety of congressional 
Acts regulating intrastate economic activity” that “we have upheld.”  514 U.S. 549, 559-
60 (1995). 
88 See Harper v. Va. Dept. of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 107 (1993) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (noting that the concept of prospectivity “would have struck John Marshall as an 
extraordinary assertion of raw power”); Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372 
(1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“I know of no authority in this court to say that in 
general state decisions shall make law only for the future.  Judicial decisions have had 
retrospective operation for near a thousand years.”); see also Fisch, supra note 66, at 
1059 (describing the “general rule of adjudicative retroactivity” and the Court’s even-
tual departure from it).  This is in contrast to the general rule of legislative prospectivity. 
89 See, e.g., R.R. Co. v. McClure, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 511, 515 (1870) (declining to 
hear a contract case dealing with the collection of state bonds); Havemeyer v. Iowa 
County, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 294, 303 (1865) (asserting that cases “long posterior to the 
[case] . . . can have no effect upon [the Court’s] decision”); Gelpcke v. City of Dubu-
que, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175, 205-06 (1863) (declining to apply a recent case decided by 
the highest state court when the contested bonds were issued and marketed before the 
case was decided). 
90 See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 146-49 
(1921) (“I think it is significant that when the hardship is felt to be too great or to be 
unnecessary, retrospective operation is withheld.”); Note, Prospective Overruling and Re-
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ing Co., the Court endorsed the Montana Supreme Court’s decision to 
limit its holding to “forward operation.”91  Cardozo wrote for the Court: 
This is a case where a court has refused to make its ruling retroactive, 
and the novel stand is taken that the Constitution of the United States is 
infringed by the refusal. 
 We think the Federal Constitution has no voice upon the subject.  A 
state in defining the limits of adherence to precedent may make a choice 
for itself between the principle of forward operation and that of relation 
backward.
92
 
It was in the context of the Warren Court’s vast expansion of the 
rights of state criminal defendants, however, that the Court’s willing-
ness to contemplate prospective application wrought the most revolu-
tionary changes and exposed the complexity of determining laws’ 
temporal effects.93  Introduced as a means of limiting the application 
of newfound constitutional rights to defendants convicted after the 
rights’ announcement,94 the new option of prospectivity (or “nonre-
troactivity,” as it was often termed) made its debut in 1965 in Linkletter 
v. Walker.95  Arising out of a state prisoner’s habeas corpus proceeding, 
Linkletter considered the question whether the rule of Mapp v. Ohio, 
which binds the states through the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to follow the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary 
troactive Application in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 907, 911 (1962) (describing Justice 
Cardozo as “the major advocate of prospective overruling”). 
91 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932); see also Linda Meyer, “Nothing We Say Matters”:  Tea-
gue and New Rules, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 423, 427 n.11 (1994) (describing how the Court 
in Great Northern Railway Co. “sustain[ed] prospective state judicial decisions against 
due process attacks”). 
92 287 U.S. at 364.   
93 See Meyer, supra note 91, at 427-29 (describing changes in criminal law doctrine 
before 1965 as “incremental and evolutionary” and explaining the effects of the 
changes in the Court’s perspective on retroactivity during the mid-1960s). 
94 See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 68, at 1734 (“Even the Warren Court might 
have hesitated to move as far and as fast as it did if each decision recognizing a ‘new’ 
right required opening the prison gates for all victims of past violations.”); Fisch, supra 
note 66, at 1059 (describing the Court’s hesitance to apply changes in criminal proce-
dure to free previously convicted defendants); K. David Steele, Note, Prospective Overrul-
ing and the Judicial Role After James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 45 VAND. L. REV. 
1345, 1349 (1992) (explaining the Court’s refusal to apply Mapp v. Ohio retroactively, 
which would have had the potential to overturn thousands of criminal convictions).  
The Warren Court chose prospective application for several of its most expansive crim-
inal cases.  See, e.g., Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 721 (1966) (declaring that the 
Miranda and Escobedo decisions were not retroactive). 
95 See 381 U.S. 618, 619-20 (1965) (holding that Mapp v. Ohio did not apply re-
troactively). 
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rule,96 operated retrospectively upon cases that had reached a final 
decision prior to the Mapp decision.97  The temporal effect of two 
prior cases was thus at issue in Linkletter :  Mapp and the case it had 
overruled, Wolf v. Colorado.98  Justice Clark held for the Court that re-
trospective application of the Mapp rule was not required, citing Jus-
tice Cardozo’s opinion in Sunburst for the proposition that “the Con-
stitution neither prohibits nor requires retrospective effect.”99 
Rejecting the Court’s prior assertion that a finding of unconstitu-
tionality negates a law’s existence,100 Clark emphasized the historical 
fact of Wolf, insisting that “the existence of the Wolf doctrine prior to 
Mapp is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot 
justly be ignored.”101  These consequences required a three-part in-
quiry into “the purpose of the Mapp rule; the reliance placed upon 
the Wolf doctrine; and the effect on the administration of justice of a 
retrospective application of Mapp.”102  As this functionalist language 
suggests, the focus of the Court had shifted from a formal considera-
tion of the essential quality of an overruled law to a struggle with the 
practical effect of the act of overruling.  In this case, the administra-
tive difficulty of applying Mapp retroactively proved to be the deciding 
factor for the Court.103 
Rather than establishing a rule of prospectivity, the Linkletter hold-
ing is best understood as providing for a discretionary approach to re-
troactivity in criminal cases.  In so doing, the Court in Linkletter 
opened the door for itself to exercise a general power of prospective 
96 367 U.S. 643, 657-60 (1961). 
97 Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 619-20.   
98 Mapp overruled Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 26 (1949), insofar as Wolf had 
failed to apply the exclusionary rule to the states.  Mapp, 367 U.S. at 654-55.  For more 
on the question of retroactivity with respect to Mapp and Wolf, see Paul Bender, The 
Retroactive Effect of an Overruling Constitutional Decision:  Mapp v. Ohio, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 
650, 650-51 (1962). 
99 Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 629 (“As Justice Cardozo said, ‘We think the Federal Con-
stitution has no voice upon the subject.’” (quoting Great N. Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & 
Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932)). 
100 See, e.g., Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886) (“An unconstitu-
tional act is . . . in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been 
passed.”); see also supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text. 
101 Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 636 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
102 Id. 
103 See id. at 637 (“To make the rule of Mapp retrospective would tax the adminis-
tration of justice to the utmost.”). 
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limitation.104  Writing for the Court, Justice Clark was careful to distin-
guish pure prospectivity from the type of nonretroactivity its holding 
contemplated.  The Court noted that the application of the rule in 
Mapp to reverse the defendant’s conviction rendered moot the ques-
tion whether Linkletter would apply Mapp prospectively, since “[a] rul-
ing which is purely prospective does not apply even to the parties be-
fore the court.”105  Instead, the primary issue before the Linkletter 
Court was the effect of Mapp on convictions that had reached final 
judgment before Mapp was decided.  Finding what was basically a li-
mited form of prospective limitation, the Court held that Mapp ap-
plied to the facts of that case, that Mapp applied to all other convic-
tions on direct review and not yet final at the time of the Mapp 
decision, and that the Court was not required to overturn convictions 
that became final prior to Mapp.106 
Despite the conventional understanding of Linkletter as the semin-
al case announcing a possibility of prospectivity, its actual holding was 
not terribly revolutionary.107  Linkletter’s contribution to the retroactivi-
ty/prospectivity debate was its assertion that each decision announc-
ing a “new” constitutional rule provides an occasion for the Court to 
decide what degree of retroactivity will apply.108  The decision thus 
added another level of metadiscourse to the Court’s growing con-
sciousness of itself as more than simply the enunciator of constitu-
tional truths; it became necessary for the Court to pronounce not just 
the rule but the specific time boundaries in which the rule would op-
104 See Fisch, supra note 66, at 1059 n.15 (characterizing the Court’s application of 
retroactivity as discretionary); Mishkin, supra note 71, at 72 (discussing the Court’s 
“ability to prescribe any limited degree of retroactivity”). 
105 Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 621-22. 
106 See id. at 622, 639-40.  Besides the fact that Mapp had already been applied to 
Ms. Mapp, the Court noted that it had also been applied to cases pending on direct 
review at the time it was rendered.  See id. at 622 & n.4 (citing Stoner v. California, 376 
U.S. 483 (1964); Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 
(1963)).  The Court defined “final” to mean cases “where the judgment of conviction 
was rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for petition for certiorari 
had elapsed before our decision in Mapp v. Ohio.”  Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 622 n.5. 
107 See Mishkin, supra note 71, at 77 (referring to Mapp’s retroactivity under Linklet-
ter as “normal”); see also United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 543 (1982) (characte-
rizing the post-Linkletter norm as retroactive application of all newly declared constitu-
tional criminal procedure rules to convictions not yet final when the rules were 
established); Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 413-19 (1966) (applying 
Linkletter’s analysis to hold the rule of Griffin v. California inapplicable to judgments 
made final before Griffin was decided).  
108 See Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 629 (arguing that the Constitution’s silence on retroactiv-
ity necessitates case-by-case decisions regarding the retroactive application of new rules). 
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erate.  Linkletter therefore signaled a shift from an implicit presump-
tion of retroactivity to a new power in the Court to delineate the pre-
cise temporal boundaries of a decision’s operation. 
The reach of Linkletter’s prospectivity was quickly expanded in Sto-
vall v. Denno109 and Desist v. United States.110  In those cases, the Court 
moved even further toward a rule of pure prospectivity, according to 
which the rule announced in a given case would apply only to subse-
quent cases.  Dissenting in Desist, Justice Harlan set forth the array of 
rules governing limited retroactivity that had mushroomed since Lin-
kletter,111 concluding that by applying decisions wholly prospectively the 
Court had strayed from the original principles of nonretroactivity that 
case had articulated:  “Linkletter was right in insisting that all ‘new’ 
rules of constitutional law must . . . be applied to all those cases which 
are still subject to direct review by this Court at the time the ‘new’ de-
cision is handed down.”112 
The dissent was the first time Harlan had argued against prospec-
tivity,113 and the language of his dissent suggests a genuine epiphany.  
A self-conscious meditation on the various levels of the retroactivity 
problem, Harlan’s dissent considered both the temporal relationships 
among the various cases and the second-order doctrinal dynamic be-
tween his former and his current views on prospective application.  In 
struggling with multiple layers of the past, both his own and the 
Court’s, Harlan set the stage for a mounting unease with the Court’s 
109 388 U.S. 293, 296 (1967) (holding that two previous decisions in favor of de-
fendants’ right to counsel at lineups would apply only in those two cases and to cases 
decided after Stovall, but not to the Stovall defendant). 
110 394 U.S. 244, 246 (1969) (holding that Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 
(1967), applied only to the defendant in that case and to cases in which the surveil-
lance occurred after the date of that decision). 
111 Id. at 256-57 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
112 Id. at 258; see also Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 677 (1971) (Harlan, J., 
concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part) (“What emerges from today’s 
decisions is that in the realm of constitutional adjudication in the criminal field the 
Court is free to act, in effect, like a legislature, making its new constitutional rules 
wholly or partially retroactive or only prospective as it deems wise.”); Steele, supra note 
94, at 1351 (summarizing Harlan’s argument).  Richard Fallon and Daniel Meltzer 
note that Justice Harlan’s reconsideration of the issue began with the article by Paul 
Mishkin cited supra at note 71.  Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 68, at 1743.  Like Mishkin, 
Fallon and Meltzer noted, Harlan distinguished between direct review and habeas cor-
pus, arguing for retroactive application for all cases on direct review and on habeas 
only for certain new rules.  Id. at 1743-44. 
113 See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 68, at 1743 (“[T]he Stovall regime suffered an 
important defection in 1969, when Justice Harlan joined the opposition.”). 
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scattershot use of prospectivity, an unease that would culminate in the 
Rehnquist Court’s reformulation of the retroactivity rule. 
Notwithstanding Harlan’s vigorous dissents, prospectivity spread 
rapidly from the criminal to the civil context, starting in 1971 with 
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson.114  At issue in Chevron was the application of a 
rule regarding statutes of limitations that the Court had handed down 
while pretrial discovery proceedings were underway in Chevron.115  
Agreeing with respondent Huson that the prior decision should not 
be applied retroactively to bar actions filed before the date of its an-
nouncement, the Court enunciated a three-part test to be applied to 
cases dealing with what it now termed a question of “nonretroactivity”: 
First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new 
principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which liti-
gants may have relied or by deciding an issue of first impression whose 
resolution was not clearly foreshadowed.  Second, it has been stressed 
that “we must . . . weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking 
to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and 
whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.”  Fi-
nally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application, 
for “[w]here a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequit-
able results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for 
avoiding the ‘injustice or hardship’ by a holding of nonretroactivity.”
116
 
Two things are striking about this opinion:  first, its explicit rejec-
tion (by allowing the possibility of a new principle of law) of any no-
tion of a declaratory theory of law; second, the subtle shift in norms 
evidenced by the test’s suggestion that “discretion” had changed sides 
and now referred to the ability to apply a holding retroactively—as if 
the rule had become nonretroactivity (i.e., prospectivity), with some 
leeway remaining for retroactive application.117 
The preference for prospectivity in the civil context did not carry 
over to the criminal arena, however.  Beginning with United States v. 
Johnson118 and culminating in Griffith v. Kentucky,119 the Court began to 
retreat from prospectivity and to shift toward retroactivity in the crim-
inal context, adopting Harlan’s argument that “failure to apply a new-
114 404 U.S. 97 (1971). 
115 Id. at 98-99. 
116 Id. at 106-07 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Linkletter, 381 
U.S. at 629; Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969)). 
117 Cf. Fisch, supra note 66, at 1059 (describing the Chevron Court as having 
“adopted a discretionary approach to adjudicative retroactivity in the civil context”). 
118 457 U.S. 537 (1982). 
119 479 U.S. 314 (1987). 
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ly declared constitutional rule to criminal cases pending on direct re-
view violates basic norms of constitutional adjudication.”120  In these 
cases, the Court portrayed itself as rescuing Linkletter from the years of 
misreading that had followed it, reclaiming the decision and assimilat-
ing it back into the retroactivity tradition where it belonged.121  In-
deed, this reading of Linkletter as belonging on the retroactivity side of 
the debate seems more appropriate when one considers that the hold-
ing of that case was basically unremarkable; recall that it simply found 
that new rules for the conduct of criminal prosecutions applied re-
troactively to all cases either pending on direct review or not yet final.122 
The divergent interpretations of Linkletter and Griffith can be ex-
plained by the specific historical and doctrinal context in which each 
decision arose.  Despite their identical holdings, Linkletter and Griffith 
faced each other across a twenty-two-year gulf of case law, political 
shifts, and changes in the makeup of the Court itself.  Compared to 
the historic rule of retroactivity articulated in Norton, or even to the 
first allusion to prospectivity in Sunburst, Linkletter was revolutionary in 
its bald assertion of judicial power to define the boundaries of law in 
time.  Compared to the prospectivity cases’ endless splintering of time 
according to the precise dates of past decisions, Griffith undoubtedly 
resembled a throwback to Blackstonian retroactivity.  As an analytical 
matter, the principal distinction between the cases is the degree to 
which they foreclose the option they do not select:  Linkletter explicitly 
allowed for the possibility of retroactive effect despite its rhetoric of 
prospectivity,123 while Griffith mandated retroactive application and 
thus effectively eliminated prospective application of new rules for the 
conduct of criminal prosecutions.124  Thus, the decision in Linkletter 
was fundamentally an expansive one, in contrast to the more restric-
tive holding of Griffith.125 
120 Id. at 322. 
121 See, e.g., id. at 328 (Powell, J., concurring) (describing the Court’s decision as 
“an important step toward ending the confusion that has resulted from applying Lin-
kletter v. Walker on a case-by-case basis” (citation omitted)).  In a sense, then, the Rehn-
quist Court subscribed to the declaratory theory writ large by rehabilitating a decision 
to correct past “mistakes.” 
122 See supra text accompanying notes 107-108. 
123 See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965). 
124 See Griffith, 479 U.S. at 328 (“[A] new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecuc-
tions is to be applied retroactively to all cases . . . with no exception . . . .”). 
125 Then again, one could mount a convincing argument that because Griffith re-
troactivity requires the application of new laws to a much wider sweep of time—i.e., all 
time, past and future—than Linkletter’s from-this-point-onward application, it is actually 
the Griffith holding that is the more expansive of the two. 
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Whatever its scope, however, the specter raised in Griffith of “new 
rule[s]” and “newly declared constitutional rule[s]”126 returned to 
form the foundation of the Court’s ruling in Teague v. Lane.127  Focus-
ing exclusively on habeas petitions, Teague held that petitioners were 
not entitled to the benefit of decisions handed down after their trials 
if the decisions were “new.”128  In other words, Teague limited the rule 
of full retroactivity announced in Griffith, but only with respect to ha-
beas review.129  Relying upon Harlan’s argument that “new rules gen-
erally should not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral re-
view,”130 Justice O’Connor defined a “new” rule as one that “breaks 
new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal 
Government” or that “was not dictated by precedent existing at the 
time the defendant’s conviction became final.”131 
While these developments unfolded in the criminal context, the 
Court had remained silent on the issue of civil retroactivity, continu-
ing to apply the Chevron test and refusing to limit prospectivity in civil 
cases.132  The silence ended with James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 
however, a case that considered three different types of temporal ef-
fect and ultimately resulted in five separate opinions, none garnering 
the support of more than three Justices.133  Writing for a plurality of 
the Court, Justice Souter held that a prior ruling of the Court “should 
apply retroactively to claims arising on facts antedating that deci-
sion.”134  Souter then proceeded to outline three possible solutions to 
the problem of temporal effect:  full retroactivity, pure prospectivity, 
126 Griffith, 479 U.S. at 322, 328. 
127 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
128 See id. at 315-16; see also Morton J. Horwitz, The Supreme Court, 1992 Term—
Foreword:  The Constitution of Change:  Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 
HARV. L. REV. 30, 97 (1993) (describing the Court’s distinction in Teague between 
“old” and “new” law); Meyer, supra note 91, at 423-25 (criticizing Teague’s “new rule” 
doctrine for endangering the process of common law adjudication). 
129 Even prior to Teague, there had been discussion of the special role of retroactiv-
ity in habeas petitions.  See Mishkin, supra note 71, at 77-92 (examining the effect of 
full retroactivity on habeas cases). 
130 Teague, 489 U.S. at 305 (citing Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 682 
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part)). 
131 Id. at 301. 
132 See United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 563 (1982) (“[A]ll questions of civil 
retroactivity continue to be governed by the standard enunciated in Chevron . . . .”); see 
also Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167 (1990) (declining to limit prospectivity 
in civil cases). 
133 501 U.S. 529 (1991). 
134 Id. at 532 (plurality opinion). 
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and selective prospectivity.135  The first two were given their usual sig-
nificance.  In contrast to full retroactivity, which applies “both to the 
parties before the court and to all others by and against whom claims 
may be pressed” and is “overwhelmingly the norm,”136 Souter de-
scribed pure prospectivity as deciding the case under the old law but 
making it “a vehicle for announcing the new, effective with respect to 
all conduct occurring after the date of that decision.”137 
Selective (or modified) prospectivity, however, was something al-
together different:  the power of a court to “apply a new rule in the 
case in which it is pronounced, then return to the old one with re-
spect to all others arising on facts predating the pronouncement.”138  
According to Souter, this had been the rule in Warren Court era crim-
inal cases; and although the rule was subsequently abandoned in Grif-
fith,139 the issue of whether it could be employed in the civil context 
was before the Court in Beam.140  Connecting the Court’s criminal juri-
sprudence to its civil counterpart, Souter stated, “Griffith cannot be 
confined to the criminal law.  Its equality principle, that similarly si-
tuated litigants should be treated the same, carries comparable force 
in the civil context.  Its strength is in fact greater in the latter 
sphere.”141  Yet despite this apparently strong statement in favor of full 
retroactivity in the civil sphere, Souter’s opinion emphasized the nar-
135 Id. at 535. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 536; see, e.g., N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 
50, 88 (1982) (holding the Bankruptcy Reform Act’s extensive jurisdictional grant to 
bankruptcy judges unconstitutional and requiring that the ruling be applied prospec-
tively only); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706-07 (1969) (holding certain 
Louisiana election laws unconstitutional and requiring the ruling to be applied pros-
pectively only); England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411, 422-23 
(1964) (holding that abstention doctrine terminates a litigant’s right to return to fed-
eral court if she submits federal claims for a decision in state courts, but requiring the 
ruling to be applied prospectively only). 
138 Beam, 501 U.S. at 537 (plurality opinion). 
139 See id. at 538 (“[W]e abandoned the possibility of selective prospectivity in the 
criminal context in Griffith v. Kentucky . . . .”).  In this part of the opinion, Souter seems 
to leave pure prospectivity out of the question entirely, stating that the Griffith Court 
abandoned selective prospectivity in the criminal context in favor of complete retroac-
tivity.  Given that the term “selective prospectivity” appears not to have been used prior 
to Beam, it is difficult to know whether this is an accurate representation of the Griffith 
decision.  In a way, this becomes a question of retroactivity writ small:  if “selective 
prospectivity” had not yet been identified as such at the time of Griffith, can Griffith re-
ally be said to have “abandoned” it by choosing retroactivity?   
140 See id. at 538 (plurality opinion) (“[S]elective prospectivity appears never to 
have been endorsed in the civil context.”). 
141 Id. at 540 (citation omitted). 
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rowness of the plurality decision and the fact that it did “not speculate 
as to the bounds or propriety of pure prospectivity.”142  Thus, even 
with respect to the issue of selective prospectivity itself—not just as 
manifested in the particular facts of Beam—the holding of the Court 
remained murky. 
The other opinions set forth the entire spectrum of the retroactiv-
ity debate.  Concurring in the judgment, Justice White nevertheless 
took issue with Souter’s refusal to speculate as to the propriety of pure 
prospectivity, commenting that because the issue of prospective appli-
cation in the civil arena was settled, to “‘speculate’ about the issue is 
only to suggest that there may come a time when our precedents on 
this issue will be overturned.”143  Justice Blackmun, with whom Justices 
Marshall and Scalia joined in concurring in the judgment, cited Har-
lan’s position in the earlier criminal cases for the proposition that re-
fusal to apply a newly declared rule to cases pending on direct review 
“violates basic norms of constitutional adjudication.”144  Justice Scalia, 
joined in concurrence by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, invoked 
the declaratory theory: 
I am not so naive (nor do I think our forebears were) as to be unaware 
that judges in a real sense “make” law.  But they make it as judges make it, 
which is to say as though they were “finding” it—discerning what the law 
is, rather than decreeing what it is today changed to, or what it will tomor-
row be.
145
 
Finally, Justice O’Connor, joined in dissent by Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justice Kennedy, cited Marbury v. Madison146 for the proposition 
that “when the Court changes its mind, the law changes with it”147 and 
found no requirement of retroactive application.148 
If ever a case ignored the linear movement of historical time, Beam 
is that case.  In it, the Justices offer up multiple conceptions of how 
judge-made law operates in time.  The five opinions appear to struggle 
both within themselves and with each other in a battle of formalisms.  
Moreover, the linguistic and structural confusion of the decision re-
flects a profound doctrinal and philosophical confusion which the 
142 Id. at 544. 
143 Id. at 546 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). 
144 Id. at 547 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). 
145 Id. at 549 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
146 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
147 Beam, 501 U.S. at 550 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
148 See id. at 559 (arguing that Bacchus should not be applied retroactively). 
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Court seems to have been aware of but unable to remedy while still 
clinging to its old notions of temporal effect. 
The indeterminate nature of the decision in Beam proved no im-
pediment to the Court’s endeavor to tease a holding out of the case at 
a later date.  Indeed, the lack of consensus in Beam appears to have in-
vited multiple glosses on the topic.  The next salvo came in Harper v. 
Virginia Department of Taxation.149  The Court, per Justice Thomas, held 
that a prior decision of the Court applied retroactively.150  Although 
only two Justices in Beam (Scalia and Blackmun) had voiced definite 
opposition to prospectivity while four (White, O’Connor, Rehnquist, 
and Kennedy) had reaffirmed their support for it, the Harper Court 
stated that in Beam, “a majority of Justices agreed that a rule of federal 
law, once announced and applied to the parties to the controversy, 
must be given full retroactive effect by all courts adjudicating federal 
law.”151  To be sure, while no single opinion in Beam carried more than 
three votes,152 six Justices disapproved of selective prospectivity,153 a 
fact that bolstered Justice Thomas’s claim that the Harper holding 
flowed directly from the result in Beam.154  Yet as Justice O’Connor’s 
dissent noted, the Harper decision extended beyond Beam’s foreclo-
sure of selective prospectivity insofar as it suggested that pure prospec-
tivity might also be prohibited.155  Indeed, Harper has been widely in-
terpreted to reestablish a rule of retroactivity in civil cases,156 although 
this result is certainly not obvious from the actual holding of the case. 
Perhaps most troubling in Harper is the majority’s apparent wil-
lingness to parlay ambiguous words into new concepts.  Yet in many 
respects, this is the inevitable consequence of the way that retroactivity 
149 509 U.S. 86 (1993). 
150 Id. at 90. 
151 Id. at 96. 
152 See id. at 113 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that while Beam “yielded 
five opinions . . . no single writing carried more than three votes”). 
153 Id. at 114.  The six Justices were Souter, Stevens, White, Blackmun, Marshall, 
and Scalia.  Id. at 96-97 (majority opinion). 
154 See id. at 97 (reasoning that Beam controlled the case).  
155 See id. at 115 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (supporting this argument by citing 
references in the majority opinion to “basic norms of constitutional adjudication” and 
the “fundamental rule of retrospective operation of judicial decisions” (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)). 
156 See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 279 n.32 (1994) (citing Harper for 
a “firm rule of retroactivity”); Horwitz, supra note 128, at 94 (observing that “[t]he 
Court in Harper has now also restored the norm of retroactivity in civil cases”); see also 
Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 752 (1995) (citing Harper as the basis 
for holding that a prior Court decision finding a statute unconstitutional was retroac-
tively applicable to the present case). 
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doctrine has developed.  For example, Harper repeatedly refers to “se-
lective application of new rules,”157 a phrase that implicates both 
Beam’s prohibition of selective prospectivity and Beam’s articulation of 
the Griffith principle that “similarly situated litigants should be treated 
the same.”158  This combination is confusing on several levels and 
stems from the uncertainty of Beam itself, an uncertainty that is magni-
fied by Harper’s reliance on it.  Because the term “selective prospectivi-
ty” was not employed prior to Beam, Souter’s claim in Beam that Griffith 
“abandoned the possibility of selective prospectivity”159 is difficult to 
evaluate, in terms of both its accuracy and its consequences for Grif-
fith’s civil progeny.  If Griffith did somehow prohibit selective prospec-
tivity in the criminal context (even though the issue had not yet been 
identified in that way), then Beam would simply be the civil-side analo-
gue to Griffith, as Souter’s opinion implies.160  But if Griffith did not 
deal with selective prospectivity, one of two possibilities emerges:  ei-
ther that this species of temporal limitation had not yet been discov-
ered and was therefore not available for consideration, or that it was 
available but the Court deliberately chose to focus on the more ex-
treme case of pure prospectivity.  In any event, the meaning of Har-
per’s reference to “selective application of new rules” remained cloudy, 
and with it the relationship among Griffith, Beam, and Harper. 
Here is another difficulty with the Court’s doctrine concerning 
adjudicative retroactivity:  in order to understand the most recent 
case, one must reach back and grasp the foundational cases upon 
which it is built—Griffith, Beam, and Linkletter.  Yet to comprehend the 
foundational cases, one must read forward to discern the way in which 
their meanings changed in later interpretations.  Circularity replaces 
rectilinearity as the temporal relationships between cases double back 
and overlap each other. 
To be sure, case law in virtually every area of doctrine is suscepti-
ble to similar interpretive complications.  One cannot, for example, 
understand the Court’s 1995 interpretation of Congress’s power un-
der the Commerce Clause in United States v. Lopez161 without working 
157 Harper, 509 U.S. at 95 (quoting Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 323 (1987)). 
158 James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 540 (1991) (plurality 
opinion). 
159 Id. at 538. 
160 See id. (explaining that while “Griffith was held not to dispose of the matter of 
civil retroactivity[,] . . . [t]his case presents the issue.” (citations omitted)).  
161 See 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act was 
beyond Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause). 
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through its earlier interpretations in Wickard v. Filburn162 and Gibbons v. 
Ogden,163 from 1942 and 1824, respectively.  Moreover, if one reads 
Gibbons and Wickard with an awareness of what was to come in Lopez, 
one will almost certainly focus on different elements of each decision.  
Yet the problem of doctrinal circularity is even more acute in the con-
text of adjudicative retroactivity.  This is because the temporal order-
ing of the cases themselves matters a great deal more when the cases 
are attempting to enunciate metarules about how law operates in time. 
An attempt to analyze the holding in Beam, for example, illustrates 
this conundrum.  Reading Beam forward demonstrates that the form 
of retroactivity doctrine replicates its substance:  each decision oper-
ates as a static element, its meaning determined by the interpretation 
working upon it at that moment.  That interpretation, in turn, is sub-
ject to virtually endless redefinitions based on the decision’s temporal 
relationship to other decisions, many of which postdate the original.  
Beam had one meaning (albeit not a clear one) when it was decided in 
1991.  It received another meaning when it was incorporated into 
Harper in 1993, and the Beam -Harper combination took on yet another 
meaning in Landgraf v. USI Film Products in 1994.164  In the time be-
tween the decisions, there somehow emerged a “firm rule”—here, “of 
retroactivity”165—which will remain the rule until the next redefining 
moment comes along. 
III.  DOCTRINAL TIME HORIZONS 
Although the Court has distanced itself from its doctrinal forays 
into adjudicative retroactivity, it has nevertheless continued to expe-
riment with designing the time frames in which its decisions will oper-
ate.  In these recent instances of thinking explicitly about time, the 
Court has also continued to assert its own supremacy as the creator of 
temporal frameworks.  In contrast to the early Court’s consideration 
of transitions between legal regimes, the nineteenth-century Court’s 
attacks on certain species of retroactive legislation, and the twentieth-
century Court’s efforts to take a realist approach to time by attempting 
prospective application of its own decisions, the current Court’s inter-
162 See 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942) (upholding the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 
1938 as a valid exercise of Congress’s commerce power). 
163 See 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 239-40 (1824) (holding that Congress has the power 
to regulate the navigation of interstate waters under the Commerce Clause). 
164 511 U.S. 244 (1994); see also supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
165 Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 279 n.32. 
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est in time appears to center on issues of time horizons and temporal 
packaging. 
One of the Court’s most ambitious efforts to control change over 
time came in its 2002 decision in Grutter v. Bollinger.166  In Grutter, the 
Court was confronted with a challenge to the University of Michigan 
Law School’s use of race in admissions decisions.167  The law school 
had adopted an official admissions policy that specifically aimed to 
achieve diversity in its student body by enrolling a “critical mass” of 
students from underrepresented minority groups.168  Pursuant to the 
policy, admissions officers undertook a “flexible assessment of appli-
cants’ talents, experiences, and potential to contribute to the learning 
of those around them.”169  The policy did not enumerate specific crite-
ria for achieving diversity but did emphasize the law school’s 
“longstanding commitment” to “racial and ethnic diversity with special 
reference to the inclusion of students from groups which have been 
historically discriminated against, like African-Americans, Hispanics 
and Native Americans, who without this commitment might not be 
represented in our student body in meaningful numbers.”170  A white 
female Michigan resident who had been denied admission brought 
suit, claiming that the law school’s policy amounted to racial discrimi-
nation in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.171 
Writing for the Court, Justice O’Connor held that the law school’s 
use of race in its admissions process withstood scrutiny under the 
Equal Protection Clause insofar as it was “narrowly tailored . . . to fur-
ther a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that 
flow from a diverse student body.”172 
As part of her opinion, Justice O’Connor stated, 
 We are mindful, however, that “[a] core purpose of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was to do away with all governmentally imposed discrimina-
tion based on race.”  Accordingly, race-conscious admissions policies 
must be limited in time.  This requirement reflects that racial classifica-
tions, however compelling their goals, are potentially so dangerous that 
they may be employed no more broadly than the interest demands.  En-
shrining a permanent justification for racial preferences would offend 
166 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
167 Id. at 311. 
168 Id. at 316. 
169 Id. at 315 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
170 Id. at 316. 
171 Id. at 316-17. 
172 Id. at 343. 
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this fundamental equal protection principle.  We see no reason to ex-
empt race-conscious admissions programs from the requirement that all 
governmental use of race must have a logical end point.  The Law 
School, too, concedes that all “race-conscious programs must have rea-
sonable durational limits.”
173
 
Race-conscious programs, Justice O’Connor continued, therefore re-
quired a “termination point” in order to convey to the nation that 
“the deviation from the norm of equal treatment of all racial and eth-
nic groups is a temporary matter.”174 
Justice O’Connor followed these general statements concerning 
the need for sunset provisions in race-conscious admissions policies 
with a specific prognosis for what the duration of those policies might 
be.  “It has been 25 years since Justice Powell first approved the use of 
race to further an interest in student body diversity in the context of 
public higher education,”175 she wrote, referring to the Court’s 1978 
decision in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.176  Noting the 
trend of increasingly well-qualified minority applicants, Justice 
O’Connor concluded, “We expect that 25 years from now, the use of 
racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest 
approved today.”177 
As Vikram David Amar and Evan Caminker have noted, this 
statement from Justice O’Connor is “jurisprudentially unusual” in that 
it attempts to set up “a transitional state of constitutional affairs.”178  
Amar and Caminker regard this “judicial transitioning” as distinct 
from a prospective decision, in that the O’Connor approach seems to 
assume that the law today and the law twenty-five years from now are 
the same, but that the Court will impose a hiatus before recognizing 
that law.179  In prospective application, by contrast, the law changes as 
of “now” and then carries forward continuously.  Amar and Caminker 
173 Id. at 341-42 (citation omitted) (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 
(1984)). 
174 Id. at 342 (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 510 (1989)). 
175 Id. at 343. 
176 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
177 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343. 
178 Vikram David Amar & Evan Caminker, Constitutional Sunsetting?:  Justice 
O’Connor’s Closing Comments in Grutter, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 541, 551 (2003). 
179 See id. at 552 (“[T]here is but a fine line between saying, ‘Today the law is X but 
tomorrow the law will be Y,’ and saying, ‘Today the law is Y but we will delay imple-
menting that law until tomorrow.’”). 
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hypothesize that the transitioning approach might be used strategical-
ly to defuse resistance to a particularly controversial legal change.180 
Whatever its motivation, Justice O’Connor’s statement lent itself 
to a variety of interpretations by the other Justices.  In her concur-
rence, Justice Ginsburg agreed that “race-conscious programs must 
have a logical end point,” citing international anti-discrimination ac-
cords.181  But Justice Ginsburg questioned the majority’s selection of 
twenty-five years as the relevant time frame for terminating such pro-
grams.  In the twenty-five years since the Court’s decision in Bakke, she 
noted, the status of race-conscious admissions policies had remained 
unsettled; in addition, the Court had declared public school segrega-
tion unconstitutional only twenty-five years before Bakke.182  Both these 
facts, Justice Ginsburg hinted, suggested that in the long history of ra-
cial discrimination in America, twenty-five years might not be suffi-
cient time for meaningful societal change to occur.183  Justice Gins-
burg ended her concurrence by recasting Justice O’Connor’s 
expectation of a twenty-five-year time horizon:  “[O]ne may hope, but 
not firmly forecast, that over the next generation’s span, progress to-
ward nondiscrimination and genuinely equal opportunity will make it 
safe to sunset affirmative action.”184 
In separate dissents, Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist 
offered critiques of the twenty-five-year time frame.  Justice Thomas 
joined the concluding sentence of Justice O’Connor’s opinion, “We 
expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no 
longer be necessary to further the interest approved today”;185 howev-
er, he added that this agreement was based on a conviction that the 
law school’s admissions policies were already unconstitutional.186  
180 See id. at 553 (noting the prevalence of judicial transitioning in the context of 
legal changes involving race, pointing to, as examples, the Constitution’s prohibition 
on ending the slave trade before 1808, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, and the Supreme 
Court’s use of the phrase “all deliberate speed” in the second Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion decision, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955)).  On the widespread, but understudied, use of 
sunset or “duration” provisions in legislation, see generally Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary 
Legislation, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 247 (2007). 
181 539 U.S. at 344 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
182 See id. at 345 (describing this evolution to suggest that racial bias “remain[s] 
alive in our land”). 
183 Id. 
184 Id. at 346. 
185 Id. at 343 (majority opinion); see id. at 351 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“I agree 
with the Court’s holding that racial discrimination in higher education will be illegal 
in 25 years.”). 
186 Id. at 375 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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Moreover, Justice Thomas’s opinion exposed disagreement among 
the Justices as to the doctrinal status of the twenty-five-year timeframe.  
Justice Thomas referred to “the Court’s holding that racial discrimina-
tion will be unconstitutional in 25 years,”187 but Justice Ginsburg 
termed it a “hope,”188 and Chief Justice Rehnquist called it a “limita-
tion.”189  Given that the choice of the twenty-five-year timeframe, as 
opposed to a general statement that race-conscious programs must 
have some finite duration, was not itself essential to the Court’s deci-
sion, Justice Thomas’s suggestion that it formed part of the case’s 
holding does not seem entirely accurate.190 
Perhaps what is so striking about Justice O’Connor’s opinion in 
Grutter is its insistence on a linear progression of judicial time and on 
the symmetry between judicial and societal time.191  The twenty-five-
year timeframe represents an attempt by the Court to set an explicit 
time horizon, a temporal boundary in which all subsequent statements 
by the Court will be enclosed.  In other words, with the tolling of the 
twenty-five-year period, whether a forecast, a hope, or a prediction, 
the era of race-conscious admissions policies in higher education will 
come to an end.  In Reinhart Koselleck’s terms, the Court is con-
sciously attempting to define one of the “social and political units of 
action” characteristic of historical time.192  The era of race-conscious 
187 Id. at 376. 
188 Id. at 346 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
189 Id. at 386 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“The Court suggests a possible 25-year 
limitation on the Law School’s current program.”). 
190 See Joel K. Goldstein, Justice O’Connor’s Twenty-Five Year Expectation:  The Legitima-
cy of Durational Limits in Grutter, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 83, 92 (2006) (arguing that “the 
Court certainly did not put a twenty-five year ‘limit’ on race-conscious admissions pro-
grams”); cf. Christopher J. Schmidt, Caught in a Paradox:  Problems with Grutter’s Expec-
tation that Race-Conscious Admissions Programs Will End in Twenty-Five Years, 24 N. ILL. U. 
L. REV. 753, 761 (2004) (calling Justice O’Connor’s timeframe “an aspiration rather 
than a description of reality” and “[a]n arbitrary line in the sand”).  But see Kevin R. 
Johnson, The Last Twenty Five Years of Affirmative Action?, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 171, 181 
(2004) (referring to “the new 25-year limit on affirmative action”). 
191 The same equation of judicial and societal time is evident in Justice 
O’Connor’s subsequent writings following her resignation from the Court.  See, e.g., 
Sandra Day O’Connor & Stewart J. Schwab, Affirmative Action Over the Next Twenty-Five 
Years:  A Need for Study and Action (“When the time comes to reassess the constitutional-
ity of considering race in higher-education admissions, we will need social scientists to 
clearly demonstrate the educational benefits of diverse student bodies, and to better 
understand the links between role models in one generation and aspirations and 
achievements of succeeding generations.”), in THE NEXT TWENTY-FIVE YEARS:  AFFIR-
MATIVE ACTION IN HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AFRICA 58 
(David L. Featherman et al. eds., 2010). 
192 KOSELLECK, supra note 5, at 110. 
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admissions policies, on this view, can be neatly contained within the 
fifty-year period between the Bakke decision and some potential, fu-
ture decision in 2028 in which the Court will pronounce the era’s end. 
In this sense, Grutter  represents the high-water mark of the Court’s 
temporal imperialism.  Indeed, the apparently effortless chain of rea-
soning by which Justice O’Connor arrives at the twenty-five-year time-
frame surpasses even the Court’s twentieth-century retroactivity doc-
trine in the confidence it displays toward the Court’s ability to reframe 
and rearrange temporal issues.  The “before” of the long history of ra-
cial discrimination in American society, and law’s efforts first to 
uphold and then to combat such practices, is erased.  Instead, the ma-
jority opinion presents an almost technocratically derived model of 
how long a remedial regime ought to endure, choosing as a starting 
point the Court’s own previous decision and suggesting a forward 
march of progress from that point onward.  Prospectivity is the me-
thod; teleology is the theory; and the Court is the sole arbiter of when 
the goal has been reached. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has examined the different approaches the Court uses 
to conceptualize change and transition, against the backdrop of the 
Court’s overarching commitment to and narrative of continuity over 
time.  The three case studies discussed—the early republican deci-
sions construing the Ex Post Facto and Contracts Clauses; twentieth-
century retroactivity doctrine; and the Court’s recent decisions on 
temporal framing in the antidiscrimination context—demonstrate 
that the operation of law in time has been a central theme for the 
Court since its earliest days. 
As these examples from across more than two centuries of consti-
tutional decisionmaking illustrate, the Court’s institutional commit-
ment to continuity exists in tension with its general doctrinal com-
mitment to precedent.  Occasionally, the Court engages in intense 
scrutiny of the temporal effect of its decisions, and these moments 
demonstrate the complex causal and rhetorical relationship between 
the Court’s institutional continuity on one hand, and its power to 
create doctrinal discontinuity on the other hand.  The posture of in-
stitutional endurance may in fact make constitutional law transitions, 
both doctrinal and conceptual, more palatable. 
The Court’s efforts throughout its history to evaluate the temporal 
effect of legislation, to engage in segmentation of its decisions forward 
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and backward in time, and to package its doctrine into discrete 
epochs are striking because they show the Court consciously creating 
moments of temporal disjunction against a backdrop of self-described 
institutional stability.  Examination of the Court’s explicit forays into 
thinking about time offer a lens through which we can understand 
how the Court thinks about the related issues of its own institutional 
role, the question of when and how law originates, and the nature of 
legal change more broadly.  Paradoxically, from the 1790s through 
the early twenty-first century, the Court’s treatment of temporal issues 
has been consistent insofar as it has insisted on its own historical and 
institutional continuity as well as its power to create and manage doc-
trinal discontinuity. 
 
